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POLICE INTERROGATION IN COLORADO:
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MIRANDA *
By

LAWRENCE S. LEIKENt

In this article, empirical research and analysis are presented which
deal with the effect of the Miranda decision on the actual interrogation "contest" and the ultimate resolution of that contest in the
courtroom. Interviews with suspects in the Denver County jail indicate
that the Miranda warnings do not impart a working knowledge of
their constitutional rights to the suspects and raise questions as to the
validity of the signe warning and waiver form which is used by the
Denver police as evidence of a "°knowingand intelligent waiver" of the
rights of the suspects. The data also indicate that the right to counsel
as a measure to protect the fifth amendment privilege can be frustrated
by the police by noncompliance with requests for counsel, by obtaining
"knowing and intelligent waivers" of the right (or evidence thereof),
or by both. Psychological tactics and strategies, including promises and
threats, still appear to be the major factors influencing the suspect's
decision to talk in the interrogationroom. The police and the judicial
responses to Miranda are analyzed in terms of the findings referred to
above, and the author concludes that the effect of Miranda on the
game of interrogation is effectively neutralized in its implementation.
Indeed, one of the latent functions of Miranda appears to be to aid the
police in overcoming their evidentiary burden with respect to proving
the suspect's knowledge and waiver of his constitutional rights. The
author further concludes that making the right to counsel nonwaivable
is a viable solution to the problems of effectively achieving the goals
implicit in the Miranda decision.
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INTRODUCTION

W

ITHIN each game there is a well-established set of goals whose
achievement indicates success or failure for the participants, a
set of socialized roles making participant behavior highly predictable,
a set of strategies and tactics handed down through experience and
occasionally subject to improvement and change, an elite public whose
approbation is appreciated, and, finally, a general public which has
some appreciation for the standing of the players. Within the game
the players can be rational in the varying degrees that the structure
permits. At the very least, they know how to behave and they know the

score.'
1

N. LONG, THE POLITY 142 (1962).
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Although the preceding passage was written as a means to
analyze governmental policies in local communities, it also provides
a point of orientation for a study of the police interrogation process.
If the process is viewed as "a game," the players can be viewed as
having strategies and tactics which are, of course, employed within
the framework of a body of rules. There may be some predictability
with respect to the nature of their roles. The players may be rational
in varying degrees, and their attitudes toward the process itself may
be an important determinant of the outcome. There may be various
publics which are concerned with the rules by which the game is
played and with which side prevails. The purpose of the following
study is to describe a few of the elements of "the game" of interrogation after the rules were changed by the historic decision of Miranda
2
v. Arizona.
To provide some background information with respect to the
issues in conflict and the rules of the game, the study begins with
a brief sketch of some of the ambiguous areas surrounding Miranda
and a few interpretations in those areas by state and federal courts
in Colorado. Within the framework of the general law governing
the interrogation process, a description of the procedures used to
implement the Miranda rules will complete the description of the
setting. Since almost all of the interrogations which will be explored
here occurred in the Denver Police Station, an effort will be made
to explain the procedures which are generally used by that agency
to convey the Miranda warnings.
Secondly, information which was collected through interviews
with suspects at the Denver County Jail during July and August of
1969 will be used to describe their roles within and attitudes toward
"the game" of interrogation, the extent of their knowledge
of the
rules, and the reasons for their decisions with regard to the exercise
of their rights. The attitudes and strategies of the police will be
presented through both a description of interviews with them and
observations of the manner in which they conduct interrogations. In
order to realistically appraise these descriptions and observations, each
of the sections will include a brief explanation of the methodology
which was used to collect the information.
The ultimate contest is often resolved in the courtroom. The
study returns to the courtroom where the focus is on the judiciary's
view of Miranda and the difficulty of reconstructing the interrogation
scene for the court. The study ends with some conclusions and recommendations with respect to the future of the interrogation process.
2 384

U.S. 436 (1966).
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DEFINING THE RULES OF THE GAME

A. Resolving Ambiguous Areas: Judicial Interpretation of the Rules
for Interrogation in Colorado
Miranda prescribes procedures to protect the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to
counsel. The case essentially holds that to protect these rights during
an in-custody interrogation (in the absence of other effective measures), the following warnings must be given to suspects: They must
be warned that anything they say may be used against them; that
they need not answer any questions; that they have the right to
counsel during interrogation; and that, if they are indigent, counsel
3
will be appointed to represent them.
A reading of the Miranda opinion seems to make it apparent
that the decision was made in response to what the Court considered
to be unfair police tactics in the interrogation room. The Court
quoted extensively from police manuals and texts "which document
procedures employed with success in the past, and which recommend
various other effective tactics."'4 Although the Court stressed that "the
modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather
than physically oriented," 5 it nonetheless concluded that "without proper
safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected
or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which
work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him
to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." 6 The warning
procedure required for apprising the suspect of his rights was designed
to combat and overcome the inherently compelling pressures and to
permit a full opportunity for the exercise of a suspect's privilege
against self-incrimination. 7
It is interesting to note that the Court realized the insufficiency
of a warning alone to protect the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination:
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his
Our aim is to assure that the indiprivilege by his interrogators ....

vidual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered
throughout the interrogation process. .

. . A mere warning given by
the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end. 8

The Court therefore held that the right to have counsel present at
3

1d. at 467-73.

4Id. at 448-49. The primary texts referred to were: F.
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962);
5

INVESTIGATION (1956).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966).

6 Id. at 467.

7 id.
8
Id. at 469-70.

INBAU &

J.

REID, CRIMINAL

C. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
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the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the suspect's
rights and that he must accordingly be further warned that he has
the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
during the interrogation. 9
When the suspect has been further warned of his rights, if the
interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant "knowingly and intelligently waived" his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel."0
Although one of de avowed purposes of the Miranda decision
was "to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement
agencies and courts to follow,"" it did not necessarily resolve all
of the questions dealing with interrogation room practices.
For instance, some ambiguity remains, at least in Colorado, as
to what constitutes "in-custody interrogation." In Miranda, the Court
defined in-custody interrogation as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.""2
In Mares v. United States,1" the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that the Miranda warnings need not be given
if the defendant is not under arrest and is free to continue the interview or leave as he sees fit. 4 The court, however, did not address
itself to the question of whether or not the suspect himself realized
that he could leave the interview at will or whether his subjective
impression regarding his freedom to leave would have affected the
court's finding. Similarly, in United States v. Wainright,15 the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado chose not to follow
the "custodial" test of Miranda and, without any explanation, apparently based its decision on the "focus" test of Escobedo v. Illinois6
9

Id.

'Old. at 475.

11Id. at 442.
12Id. at 444.
13 383 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1967).
14 Id. at 813. The defendant asserted

that the trial court erred in receiving testimony of
an FBI agent regarding a false alibi which the defendant had given. Although the
testimony was apparently not given to establish the truth or falsity of what was contained
in defendant's statement, a hearing was held out of presence of the jury on the admissibility of this evidence. The agents testified that they gave the defendant full and complete
warnings of his rights. The defendant admitted full knowledge of his rights and showed
familiarity with criminal investigations and procedures. The court nevertheless held
Miranda to be inapplicable because the defendant was not under arrest and was free to
continue the interviews or leave as he saw fit. Id.
15284 F. Supp. 129 (D. Colo. 1968).
16 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The "focus" test as laid down by the Escobedo Court is that the
right to counsel attaches when "the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect ...." Id. at 490 (emphasis
added).
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held that the defendant should have been warned of his rights
because the adversary process of criminal justice had been directed
against him as a potential criminal defendant as soon as he became
a subject of criminal tax investigation by the Internal Revenue Service. 17 While the court relied on both Miranda and Escobedo in its
opinion, 8 it failed to distinguish between them or to suggest why
it chose to apply the standards of the earlier case rather than those
of the later one.
Although there are numerous other ambiguities in the rules for
interrogation in Colorado,' 9 perhaps the most troublesome vagary in
the Miranda opinion (and the one most relevant to this study) is the
question of what constitutes a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of
constitutional rights. The problem here is ascertaining the factors to
be considered in determining whether or not there has been a Miranda
waiver and the weight to be given to each of these factors.
This is not a new problem since the same difficulty was encountered under Escobedo.2 ° A case decided by the Supreme Court of
Colorado under Escobedo points to some of the criteria which may
be used to define a "knowing and intelligent waiver." In Nez v.
People," the statements of a semiliterate Navajo Indian were held to
be inadmissable. Among the determinative factors were his limited
understanding of the English language and his ignorance of both
the legal processes and his constitutional rights.2 2
An additional variable which has been used in determining
whether there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver is the age
of the suspect. In the pre-Miranda, pre-Escobedo case of Gallegos v.
Colorado,2 ' the United States Supreme Court overturned a conviction
which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Colorado because
the age of the suspect had not been given sufficient weight by the
courts below. 24 The prosecution argued that the boy had been advised
of his right to counsel and chose not to exercise it; but the Court
found that
-it

[a] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have
any conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible
only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a person who is not
equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences
of the questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know
'v

United States v. Wainwright, 284 F. Supp. 129, 132 (D. Colo. 1968).

181d.
19 See generally, Note, Legal Limitations on Miranda, 45 DENVER L.J. 427 (1968).
20 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964).
21445 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1968).
22 Id. at 78.
23 370 U.S. 49 (1962), rev/g 145 Colo. 53, 358 P.2d 1028 (1960).
24 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962).
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how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his
25
constitutional rights.

In the pre-Miranda cases, one sees the courts evaluating such
factors as the previous experiences of the suspect with the criminal
process, his intelligence, his education and mastery of the English
language, his age, and other variables. In the Miranda opinion itself,
however, the Court declared that
[a]ssessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on
information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with
authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact. More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable
individual knows he is
to overcome its pressures and to insure that the 26
free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.

It is not clear from this language whether or not fhese various
factors will continue to be given weight in determining the defendant's knowledge of his rights. Ostensibly, Miranda is an improvement
upon Escobedo since it requires that the warnings or their equivalent
be given before there can be "a knowing and intelligent waiver."
On the other hand, a strong case can be made that as a result of the
warning rules, these external considerations are subjected to less
careful scrutiny than they were given under Escobedo.2"
As illustrated by the Colorado cases, Miranda standards continue
to be ambiguous and difficult to administer in many instances. While
the United States Supreme Court was initially responsible for these
problems, it is apparent that the ambiguities can be dispelled more
quickly if the lower courts and the members of the bar confront them
directly. In any event, as the standards are applied to more factual
situations, further clarification of the rules would appear to be almost
inevltable.2 S
25

Id. at 54.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966).
27 This proposition is discussed in §§ II(C) (2) & IV(B) infra.
28 The argument for further clarification is not to be taken as a denigration of "creative
ambiguity," which could give the states wider latitude for experimentation and judges
broad discretionary powers in decisions based on the facts before them. Indeed, a cogent
argument can be made that the central problem with Miranda is its egregious emphasis
on specific warnings. From this point of view, Miranda's weakness is not too much
ambiguity but too little "creative ambiguity." For a case which has been implemented
more effectively than Miranda because of its 'creative ambiguity," see United States v.
Vade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
The Supreme Court of Colorado did in fact clarify somewhat the ambiguous but
important concept of what constitutes a "knowing and intelligent waiver" in the recent
case of Billings v. People, 466 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1970). The court approved Judge
Lewis' concurring and dissenting opinion in the recent case of Sullins v. United States,
389 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1968). In the Sullins case, Judge Lewis indicated that "an
express declination of the right to counsel is not an absolute from which, and only from
which, a valid waiver can flow," (despite the fact that Miranda stated that "an express
statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an
attorney could constitute a waiver.") Billings v. People, 466 P.2d 474, 476 (Colo. 1970)
(emphasis added). In Billings, the Supreme Court of Colorado did not address itself
to the question of waiver of the right to counsel or the question of waiver of both fifth
26
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B. The Colorado Procedure for Implementing Miranda
1. The Judicial Role in Implementing Miranda and the Colorado
Rules Relating to Confessions
The ultimate contest is often resolved in the courtroom. However, within the framework of the general law governing the interrogation process, the judiciary is able to assert only a limited role in
enforcing the implementation of the Miranda rules within the interrogation room.
The Colorado procedure for determining the admissibility of a
challenged statement or confession is to hold a hearing, out of the
presence of the jury (when there is a jury trial) in which the court
determines admissibility as a matter of fact and law. The jury or
judge may then determine the weight to be given to the statement,
but a jury may not hear the statement before the court has made a
prior determination that the Miranda requirements were met.2 9
The judiciary also has some self-imposed responsibilities which
may overlap with the requirements of Miranda and affect its implementation. The Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure require that
any person who is arrested on a warrant shall be taken before the
nearest available county judge without unnecessary delay. 30 The judge
is to inform the arrested person, among other things, that he is not
required to make a statement, and that any statement made by him
may be used against him. The judge is also required to allow the
defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel.3 1
Nevertheless, it can be asserted that the role of the judiciary
in Colorado is in many cases limited to a determination of the
admissibility of a statement or confession. For example, though the
county judge in the Denver Police Station often sees the defendants
the morning after they have been picked up and warns them of their
rights pursuant to Rule 5,32 the suspects who are charged with serious
crimes generally have been questioned the night before. Thus, the
suspect is dependent on the police both to warn him of his constituand sixth amendment rights. Rather, it appeared to conclude that an express statement,
"I understand," followed closely by a confession could constitute a waiver of the
privilege against self-incrimination, without considering the question of waiver of the
right to counsel (which apparently had not been waived in this case). Having set forth
these guidelines, the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether
or not there had been a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 476-77.
Quaere whether or not it is reasoning such as this which prompts the Denver Police
Department to include on its advisement form only a waiver provision for the
privilege against self-incrimination. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
For other recent cases clarifying Miranda, see Gilmore v. People, No. 23460 (Sp.
Ct. Court., April 8, 1970) (dealing with voluntary statements) ; Neitz v. People, 462
P.2d 498 (Colo. 1969) (illustrating the significance of the waiver form).
29
30
31
32

Compton v. People, 444 P.2d 263, 266 (Colo. 1968).
CoLo. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
COLo. R. CRIM. P. 5(b)(1).
Coo. R. CRIM. P. 5.

1970

POLICE INTERROGATION IN COLORADO

tional rights and to contact an attorney for him if he chooses to
exercise his right to counsel during interrogation. In short, the only
decisive impact of the judiciary generally on the process is the decision
to admit or suppress the statement.
2. The Police Role in Implementing Miranda: The Warning
Procedure used by the Denver Police Department
Some aspects of the police role in the interrogation process will
be considered in greater detail later in the study. 3 The purpose here
is to define generally the procedures used by the Denver Police Department to implement the Miranda rules.
The most important function of the Denver police and detectives
in the implementation of Miranda is to read the standard advisement
form to the suspect and to attempt to secure one signature indicating
that he understands the rights that have been read to him and a
second signature indicating that he wishes voluntarily to talk to the
interrogator. Generally, the rights are read aloud to the suspect, and
he is asked whether or not he wants to sign. If he signs the form, it
34
it is immediately taken from him and he is not given a copy.
DENVER POLICE DEPARTMENT ADVISEMENT FORM35
Name
Birthdate
Date
-Time
Location_
You have a right to remain silent.
Anything you say can be used as evidence against you in court.
You have a right to talk to a lawyer before questioning and have him
present during questioning.
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before
questioning.
Do you understand each of these rights I have read to you?
Answer
Signature of Person Advised_
Knowing my rights and knowing what I am doing, I now wish to
voluntarily talk to you.
Signature of the Person Advised
Witnessed by
Signature of the Advising Officer
33 See text, § III inIra.
It is interesting to speculate on the importance of not giving the suspect a copy of the

34

signed waiver form and having the form taken from him immediately upon signing.

By the quick removal of the form, the police would seem to be able to place minimal
importance on the signing of the waiver provision and make it appear to the suspect that
the signing is a mere legal formality which the police and all those interrogated must
execute. This tactic appears to be consistent with the Denver police strategy of encouraging the suspect to forget the form and the rights advisement as soon as possible after
the signing so that the interrogation can get underway and the police can elicit the
information desired from the suspect. For a discussion of the significance of the waiver
form to the suspect, see text, § II(E) inira. For a discussion of the tactic of distracting
the suspect from the warnings, see text, at 38 infra.
35Denver Police Department, Form 369, June, 1967.
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There is a great emphasis on the reading of the advisement form,
and this procedure is almost never omitted during interrogations by
members of the Denver Police Department. The findings in this
study differ in this respect from those of the Yale study of the New
Haven Police Department, conducted shortly after Miranda had taken
effect. 6 At that time in New Haven, less than half the suspects had
received a warning which included more than half of the specific
warnings required by Miranda."
Of course, one reason for the better performance of the Denver
police in giving the warnings is that much more knowledge about
Miranda has been disseminated since the New Haven study and the
police have been better trained to meet its requirements. A second
reason for the greater percentage of warnings given by the Denver
police may be that the New Haven police were given separate advisement of rights and waiver of rights forms, 38 whereas the Denver

"advisement form" includes the provision for waiver of rights. 9
Arguably, the Denver police are induced to read the complete warning
regularly because the waiver of rights provision which they wish
signed appears on the same form.
In Denver, the suspect is often presented with an advisement
upon arrest. In some cases suspects sign the advisement form before
or as soon as they get into the squad car; in others, the warnings are
given for the first time in the interrogation room of the police station.
Police preoccupation with the advisement form and its waiver provision is demonstrated by repeated offerings of the form to suspects
40
who refuse to sign the first time the form is offered.
There is another, collateral role, in addition to advisement, which
some Denver police officers have undertaken in accordance with
Miranda. This involves permitting a nonindigent suspect who requests
counsel before or during interrogation to contact private counsel or
the public defender's office. The extent of compliance with these
requests will be considered later. 41 It is sufficient to say here that at
least some detectives consider compliance with such requests to be
part of their legal obligation.4 2
Like the judiciary, the Denver police have undertaken a limited
role with respect to the implementation of M'iranda. They have been
3

6Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519

37

(1967).

1d. at 1550-51.

38 Id. at 1551.
39 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
40 See text, at 30-31 & 39-40 infra.
41 See text, § 11(D) infra.
42 Interview with Bryan Morgan, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender,
Denver, Colorado.
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primarily concerned
and his talking with
form to the suspect
rights. Interrogators
II.

with the suspect's signing of the waiver form
them. In general, they read the entire advisement
but give him no other explanation of his legal
have also contacted lawyers for the suspects.

THE SUSPECT'S VIEW OF THE INTERROGATION PROCESS,

His

KNOWLEDGE, AND

His

DECISIONS

Despite the ambiguities which remain in the rules set forth by
Aliranda, and despite the inability of the courts and the apparent
reluctance of the police to aggressively implement the full import of
the decision, it is nevertheless quite clear that the historic decision has,
at least nominally, quite drastically changed the rules of the "game"
of interrogation. Not only is the suspect armed with his full fledged
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel present
during interrogation, he must in addition be given the knowledge with
which to exercise those rights. As the former Police Commissioner
of New York, Michael J. Murphy, said of Escobedo: "What the Court
is doing is akin to requiring one boxer to fight by Marquis of Queensbury rules while permitting the other to butt, gouge and bite.""3 The
purpose of the investigations which are reported below was to determine the actual effectiveness of the suspect's newly defined rights in
the face of what the United States Supreme Court referred to as the
-inherently compelling pressures ' 4 of the in-custody interrogation
process.
A. AMethod and Interpretation of Results
i. The Interviews

Interviews were conducted in the Denver County jail during July
and August, 1969, concerning suspects' most reo nt interrogations by
the police. Different suspects were interviewed at different stages
of the criminal process. Some had becn arraigned, but not yet tried,
some were in the process of being tried, and a few had already been
sentenced and were awaitinig transfer to another penal institution.
Fifty interviews were conducted in all: Forty-seven of the suspects
had been interrogated by the Denver police, two by the FBI, and
one by the Colorado Springs police. Almost all of the interrogations
occurred in the Denver Police Station.
Before each interview, the suspects were told that the interviewer
was a student doing research in the public defender's office and that
the purpose of the interview was to compile a study of the police
interrogation process. They were told that nothing that they said
43Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441 n.3 (1966). It is assumed that the commissioner

assumed that it is the suspect who is allowed to butt, gouge, and bite.
44 Id. at 466-67.
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would either help or hurt them in the defense of their case but if
they did have a specific -message to be conveyed to the public defender
who had been appointed to defend them, that message would be
passed on. An effort was made to convince the suspects that the
interviewer was making an independent study; that they could express
their views on the competency of their counsel and of the public
defender's office in general as freely as on any other subject; and
that, unless they indicated to the contrary, the use of their statements
would be limited to the study.
Two problems were inherent in the interviews and the manner
in which they were conducted. The first was one of communications.
This was particularly acute in the determination of whether a suspect
had made a "statement" or "confession" during interrogation. For
purposes of this study a "statement" is defined as a suspect's remarks
which conveyed information relating to the alleged offense to his
interrogator and which the suspect viewed as nonincriminating at
the time he made it. A "confession" or "admission," as used here, is
a statement made with the realization that it might be damaging.
These concepts, however, could not always be applied systematically
during the interviews because of difficulties in communications. Some
suspects appeared able to apply the terms accurately to their conduct;
others could not. Those in the latter group were asked to describe
everything which they had said in the interrogation room and their
reasons for talking. The observer then classified their conduct himself.
The second problem in evaluating the results of the interviews
relates to the credibility of the suspects' responses. It is possible that
some of tht questions were leading and a few of the suspects might
have tried to make themselves look like innocent dupes and the police
like crafty ogres. The donger of suggestion was recognized and minimized as much as possible. For the most part, the suspects were very
willing to describe their experiences and appeared to be candid, outspoken, and truthful.
2. Nature of Sample
In order to evaluate the general validity of the results, a brief
description of the nature of the sample is in order.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the size of the sample
may create problems concerning the validity of the results. However,
it is felt that the conclusions which are suggested by the data are
consistent with each other, and, as will be pointed out, they are generally consistent with the results of other Miranda studies which have
been conducted on a much larger scale than the present study.
All of the suspects had one thing in common: A member of the
public defender's staff had been appointed to represent them during
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or as a result of their initial court appearance. In a few cases, because
of conflicts of interest in the public defender's office, the court had
subsequently appointed private counsel to represent them. In three
cases the suspects had ultimately secured sufficient funds to retain
private counsel. One suspect insisted that the court appoint private
counsel for him because he contended that a public defender had
spoken with him at the police station and given incompetent legal
advice.
Of the 50 suspects who were interviewed, 15 were white, 21 were
Negroes, and 14 were Spanish-Americans. The median age was 25
for the whites, 23 for the Negroes, and 24 for the Spanish-Americans. The median educational level for whites was 12 years - for
Negroes and Spanish-Americans, 10 years.
The median number of previous arrests for the Spanish-Americans
was by far the highest - 15; for the whites, 8; and for Negroes, 6.
The mean number of previous felony convictions for the SpanishAmericans was 1.23, for the whites, 1.27, and for the Negroes, 0.9.
A number of alternative hypotheses might be advanced to explain the
high arrest rate and the relatively low felony conviction rate of the
Spanish-Americans. It is possible that Spanish-Americans may be
arrested for misdemeanor violations more often than whites, or that
they are more often subjected to "investigative arrests" which terminate
without prosecution or conviction. If the latter hypothesis were proved,
then perhaps Spanish-Americans are being harrassed because of a
racial or cultural bias in the system.
Another interesting observation was that the Spanish-Americans
who were interviewed talked with the police with greater frequency
than did the whites or Negroes. In 84.6 percent of the cases, they
made oral or written statements, and in 46.1 percent of the cases
they made confessions or damaging admissions. In contrast, the whites
discussed the facts of the alleged crime with their interrogator only
51 percent of the time and confessed or made admissions in only
21.4 percent of the cases. Although the Negroes made some statement
in 71.4 percent of the cases, they, like the whites, confessed or made
a damaging admission in only 28.5 percent of the cases.
The high confession rate of the Spanish-Americans cannot be
explained satisfactorily by the data available here. It cannot be
explained by their median age because it was almost as high as the
whites, nor by their number of previous felony convictions which was
almost as high as the whites. Furthermore, their experience with the
criminal process appears to have been greater than that of the other
groups because their median number of previous arrests was almost
twice as high as the whites and more than twice as high as the
Negroes.
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Although it can be argued that their low level of education
explains the higher confession rate than that of the whites, this does
not explain the divergence from the Negroes who had the same
educational background. Although language or some other cultural
factor may present a plausible explanation for this data, these factors
were not explored in this study. The purpose here is merely to present
a general picture of the characteristics of the suspects who were interviewed for this study.45
A few additional characteristics of the sample should be pointed
out. Forty-eight of the suspects interviewed were male and two were
female. Their age ranged from 17 years to 65. The arrest range was
from zero to an estimated 60 previous arrests, and the previous
felony convictions went from zero to five. Most of the suspects had
been charged with at least one serious felony. Fifteen were charged
with robbery, 12 with murder, 12 with burglary, three with possession
of narcotics, three with rape, three with theft, one with arson, and
one with manslaughter. In some cases multiple charges had been
filed, but in order to simplify the outline, only the most serious
charge is described here.
B. The Suspect's General Knowledge of His Constitutional Rights
As previously stated, the purpose of these interviews was to
determine the actual effectiveness of the suspect's newly defined
Miranda rights in the face of the "inherently compelling pressures"
of the in-custody interrogation process. According to Miranda, not
only is the suspect to be armed with his full fledged constitutional
rights to remain silent and to have counsel present during interrogation, he must in addition be given the knowledge with which to
exercise those rights. In this section, the extent of the knowledge
which is communicated to the suspect by the Miranda warnings will
be considered.
All of the suspects interviewed read or were read the rights
warnings. However, the transition from perception to understanding
may not be automatically assumed. In order to determine whether or
not the suspects "knew" at least the basic verbal substance of their
rights at the time of the interrogation, each suspect was asked whether
(at the time of the interview) he could recollect the content of the
warnings.4" If the suspects referred either directly or indirectly in
45The extent to which factors other than race may influence confession rates will be
considered in § II(C) infra.
46 As for faulty memory, public opinion experts have established that events occurring
within the preceding 12-month period are reliably recalled. See, e.g., Robbins, The
Accuracy of Parental Recall of Aspects of Child Development and of Child Rearing
Practices, 66 J. ABSTRACT & SOCIAL PSYCH. 261 (1963). It is assumed here that those
who could not recall the content of the rights warnings either did not initially understand what they were being told, even in the barest outline, or attached so little
significance to it that it was quickly forgotten.
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their answers to the right to counsel or the right against self-incrimination, even in a vague or incorrect manner, they were given credit for
remembering the rights to which they had referred. The way the
recollections were most commonly articulated by the suspects was that
"what you say could be used against you" and "you have a right to
a lawyer."
Forty percent of the suspects interviewed remembered both the
fifth and sixth amendment rights. Twenty-one percent remembered
the right against self-incrimination alone, and 8 percent remembered
only the right to counsel. Thirty-one percent could recall neither of
these rights.
It is possible, however, that the suspects' responses to this question
may understate their actual knowledge of their rights at the time of
interrogation. For example, while only about half of the suspects
remembered the right to counsel when they were asked to state their
recollections of the warnings, 73 percent indicated that they had
some familiarity with the right to counsel when a subsequent question
directed their attention specifically to that right. This discrepancy
may be in part explained by the small amount of importance attached
to the warnings by the suspects.4 7
In order to determine with more specificity the suspects' practical
understanding of their constitutional rights, several specific questions
about these rights were asked. The findings are consistent with the
proposition that many of them did not adequately understand their
rights, even if they were able to articulate crudely the basic verbal
substance.
For example, a number of the suspects knew that what they
said might be used against them, but they didn't know how it could
be used against them. Also, a number of those who remembered that
the right to counsel was somehow involved in the warnings thought
that the right attached only at the trial stage. (Twenty-seven percent
of all the suspects interviewed shared this misconception.)
When asked whether an oral statement could ever be used
against them in court, 45 percent of the suspects expressed the view
that it could not be. A few of them stated that they had thought
that the primary goal of the interrogators was to secure information
which the police could use in their investigation. Some of them were
anxious to give the police information because they felt that further
investigation of the facts might help to exonerate them. Since they
47 The significance to the suspect of signing the waiver provision, which appears on the

same form as the rights warning, is discussed in § II(E) infra. For a discussion of the
police tactic of distracting the suspect from the warnings and the waiver, see note 34
supra & text, at 47 infra. The conclusion which is suggested is that a number of suspects
may have had some prior knowledge of their rights, but that the rights warnings had
little effect in imparting such knowledge to the suspects.
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felt that only "a statement" could be admitted into evidence and a
statement had to be written out and signed by the suspects, they
had no reservations about talking.
Most of the 45 percent of the suspects who expressed the view
that an oral confession could not be used in evidence had been
extremely cooperative during interrogation, at least until they were
asked to sign a written statement. They apparently misunderstood
their relationship with the interrogator and misconstrued the function
of the interrogation process. Not surprisingly, most of them indicated
that if they had known that the oral statements could be used against
them in court, then they would not have revealed any information
to the interrogator.
The suspects were also asked the amount of information which
the law requires them to give the police. The question was asked in
such a manner as to call upon the suspects to supply an answer even
when they were not entirely certain of the validity of their answer.
Fifty-three percent stated that a suspect must give the police a means
to identify him so that they will be able to determine whether or not
they have the right man. The information generally included name,
address, age, and previous arrests, if any. Thirty-three percent indicated that the law does not require a suspect to tell the police
anything. Seven percent believed that the suspect must give the police
a means to identify him, that he has a duty to identify himself, and
that he also has a duty to identify physical objects with which the
police confront him. The remaining 7 percent indicated that the
suspect must tell the police everything about the alleged offense and
answer all of their questions.
There appears to be nothing very surprising about the suspects'
responses to this question. Generally, it is to the suspect's advantage
to identify himself. If he refuses, he may be deemed uncooperative,
the court would be informed of this, and in most cases he would have
little to gain from withholding this information. However, it is not
evident why some of the suspects felt that they had a special duty to
identify physical objects, and it is almost incredible that despite the
warnings a few of the suspects felt that one has the duty to tell the
police everything he knows about the alleged offense and answer all
questions.
C. The Decision to Talk
1. Effect of Knowledge Imparted by Warnings
The data reported above lend credence to the proposition that,
in actual practice, many suspects who are warned of their constitutional rights as required by Miranda do not gain an adequate understanding of their rights. Many cannot recall even the basic content of
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the warnings, and a substantial number of those who could recall
the warnings indicated a lack of any practical understanding of these
rights. For those who could remember the basic content of the
warnings, an attempt was made to test whether a relationship existed
between the recollection of these rights and the making of statements
and confessions by the suspects. One might expect that those who
possessed even a rudimentary knowledge of their rights would have
revealed less information to the interrogators than those who remembered none of the rights. However, the results were not entirely
consistent with this expectation.
TABLE I
Recollection of Warnings and the Making of

a Statement and/or Confession
Recollection of
Warnings

Made Statement

Made Confession

Yes

No

Total

Yes

No

Total

Recalled Right

71.4%

28.6%

100.0%

47.6%

(21)

(10)

52.4%

100.0%

Did Not Recall
Right to Counsel

85.0%
(17)

15.0%
(3)

100.0%
(20)

35.0%
(7)

65.0%
(13)

100.0%
(20)

to Counsel

TOTAL NO

(15)

(6)

(11)

(21)

(32)

(9)

(41)

(17)

(24)

(41)

Recalled Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination

80.8%
(21)

19.2%
(5)

100.0%
(26)

38.5%
(10)

61.5%
(16)

100.0%
(26)

Did Not Recall Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination

73.3%
(11)

26.7%
(4)

100.0%
(15)

46.7%
(7)

53.3%
(8)

100.0%
(15)

TOTAL NO

(32)

(9)

(41)

(17)

(24)

(41)

Recalled Both
Rights

70.6%
(12)

29.4%
(5)

100.0%
(17)

41.2%
(7)

58.8%
(10)

100.0%
(17)

Recalled One
Right

92.3%
(12)

7.7%
(1)

100.0%
(13)

46.2%
(6)

53.8%
(7)

100.0%
(13)

Recalled Neither
Right

72.7%
(8)

27.3%
(3)

100.0%
(11)

36.4%
(4)

63.6%
(7)

100.0%
(11)

(32)

(9)

(41)

(17)

TOTAL NO

(24)

(41)

*Number of suspects interviewed.

Assuming that a recollection of the content of the warning is a
reliable indicator of the suspect's knowledge of his rights at the time
of interrogation, Table I does not lead to the conclusion that mere
knowledge of Miranda rights causes the accused to talk less during
interrogation. Indeed, in a surprisingly large number of cases suspects
who could recall all or some of the content of the warnings revealed
more damaging information than those who could remember none.
For instance, those in the sample who recalled the right to counsel
were somewhat less likely to make a statement, but more likely to
make a confession than those who did not recall that right. Those
who recalled the privilege against self-incrimination were more
likely to make a statement, but less likely to make a confession than
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those who did not recall the privilege. Finally, those who recalled only
one of the rights were more likely to make both a statement and a
confession than those who recalled both rights. Those who recalled
only one right were also more likely to talk than those who recalled
neither. A partial explanation for these results may be that many of
those who were aware of their rights had little practical understanding
of these rights. Another possible interpretation is that the limited and
often distorted information which was possessed by many suspects,
was not a meaningful asset to the suspects during the interrogation
process. At the very least the data suggest that whatever knowledge is
imparted to the suspects by the warnings does not seem to have a
significant impact on their decision to talk.48
2. Effect of Factors of "Imputed Knowledge"
The Miranda warning serves as something more than just a
device to communicate knowledge to the suspect. The fact that a
warning is given also serves (and was apparently intended to serve)
as evidence that the suspect did in fact have sufficient knowledge
with which to exercise his constitutional rights. In the Miranda
opinion itself, the Court declared that
[it would] not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the
defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.
Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with
authorities,
can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut
49
fact.

The speculative factors referred to by the Court are those factors
which were used prior to Miranda in determining the knowledge and
ability of the suspect to exercise his constitutional rights at the time
of interrogation. 5" Although it is not clear whether these factors were
to continue to be given weight under Miranda, the Court seems to
have implied that the fact that a warning was given would be better
evidence of the knowledge of the suspect of his rights than would
the speculative factors. The data reported above suggest that the
warning is in fact rather poor evidence that the suspect had sufficient
knowledge with which to exercise his constitutional rights because the
knowledge which is communicated to the suspect is superficial and
has little or no effect on his decision to talk. The data reported below
will examine the effect of these speculative factors of "imputed
knowledge" on the suspect's decision to talk.
One of these factors is the age of the suspect, the assumption
48 Similar results are reported in Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv.
1347, table 11 at 1377 (1968) ; and Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact
of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, tables 11, 12 & 13 at 1565-67 (1967).
49
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966).
50
Id. at 469 n.38. See also text accompanying notes 20-27 supra.
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being that older suspects are more likely to understand and assert
their rights in the interrogation setting than extremely young suspects." As shown in Table 2, older suspects in the sample were in
fact much less likely to confess and less likely to make statements
than younger suspects.
TABLE 2

Age and the Making of a Statement or Confession
Made Statement
Age

Yes

No

Made Confessiont
Total

Yes

No

Total

Younger Than
25 Years

75.0%
(21)

25.0%
(7)

100.0%
(28)

42.9%
(12)

57.1%
(16)

100.0%
(28)

25 Years
or Older

68.2%
(15)

31.8%
(7)

100.0%
(22)

18.2%
(4)

81.8%
(18)

100.0%
(22)

(36)

(14)

(50)

(16)

TOTAL N*

(34)

(50)

*Number of suspects interviewed.
tChi square significant at .10 level. Statistical significance will be reported only where p < .10.

The assumption with respect to age is clearly consistent with
the results of the sample, although no inference can automatically
be drawn that older suspects talked less primarily because of a
superior knowledge of their rights. Perhaps they were better equipped
psychologically to cope with the interrogation situation, or experience
or temperament may have been a significant factor.
Another prevailing assumption has been that those with more
education assert their constitutional rights more effectively, due to
greater knowledge of the law or greater understanding of the warnings. In a recent study of the interrogations of 21 draft protestors seven of whom were members of the Yale faculty or staff and 11
of whom were graduate and professional students52 - the authors
concluded that the suspects knew little or nothing about their constitutional rights during interrogation: "In spite of their superior
education, few of the suspects knew their rights in even the grossest
outline."' 3 The authors also found that the FBI warnings did not
in any satisfactory way communicate their constitutional rights to
4
them.
Arguably, this Yale study focused on an anomalous sample, and
for this reason the results of the study could be misleading. The
suspects, whose conduct was examined, were middle-class civil disobedients who openly defied the selective service law as a matter of
51 See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
52 Faculty Note, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protestors,
77 YALE L.J. 300, 305 (1967).
53Id. at 305-06.
54Id. at 310-11.
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conscience. They were proud of their activity and presumably could
be expected to communicate their experience readily.5"
Nonetheless, the Denver County Jail sample comes closer to
substantiating the views expressed in the Yale Law Journal than the
prevailing assumptions about the effects of education. The finding
presented in Table 3 was that those with more than 10 years of
school were more likely to make statements than those with less
than 10 years of school and were about equally likely to confess
to the charges. If the sample is representative, there would appear
to be little or no advantage to the suspect resulting from his superior
education. It is interesting to note that the Denver police detectives
feel that they generally get more information from educated middle56
class suspects.
TABLE 3
Education and the Making of a Statement or Confession
Years of
Education

2-10
11-14
TOTAL N*

Made Statement

Made Confession

Yes

No

Total

Yes

No

Total

63.6%
(14)
75.0%
(12)

36.4%
(8)
25.0%
(4)

100.0%
(22)
100.0%
(16)

31.8%
(7)
31.3%
(5)

68.2%
(15)
68.7%
(11)

100.0%
(22)
100.0%
(16)

(26)

(12)

(38)

(12)

(26)

(38)

*Number of suspects interviewed.

A third background factor which has been used by judges to
impute knowledge to a suspect is his number of previous arrests and
felony convictions. The assumption here was that if the suspect has
had a substantial number of previous experiences with the criminal
process, he will be more knowledgeable about his rights and more
willing to assert them. As indicated in Table 4, however, those with
fewer than eight arrests made about the same number of statements
as those with more, but those with less than eight arrests had a
slightly greater tendency to confess than those with more arrests.
As indicated in Table 5, those with fewer previous felony convictions
had a slightly greater tendency to make statements and confessions
than those with more previous felony convictions.
5s The

5

authors also contend that the educated middle-class suspect feels a taboo against
rudeness which allegedly makes him reluctant to tell the interrogator that he does not
want to talk. These suspects treat interrogation as a social situation, and they treat the
interrogator as if they are meeting a new acquaintance. For instance, one of the more
knowledgeable and courageous suspects who took part in their study, asserted his fifth
amendment rights and refused to talk with an FBI interrogator. Before doing so, however,
he apologized for invoking the fifth amendment and implied that he would have
preferred to speak with the interrogator! Id. at 315.
Interview with Paul Montoya, Lieutenant, Denver Police Department, June 22, 1969.
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TABLE 4
Previous Arrests and the Making of a Statement or Confession
Number of
Previous Arrests

0-8
9 Plus
TOTAL No

Made Statement

Made Confession

Yes

No

Total

Yes

No

Total

70.4%
(19)
71.4%
(15)

29.6%
(8)
28.6%
(6)

100.0%
(27)
100.0%
(21)

33.3%
(9)
28.6%
(6)

66.7%
(18)
71.4%
(15)

100.0%
(27)
100.0%
(21)

(48)

(15)

(33)

(48)

(34)

(14)

*Number of suspects interviewed.

TABLE

5

Previous Felony Convictions and the Making of a Statement or Confession
Number of Previous
Felony Convictions

Made Statement

Made Confession

Yes

No

Total

Yes

No

Total

0-1

69.7%
(23)

30.3%
(10)

100.0%
(33)

33.3%
(11)

66.7%
(22)

100.0%
(33)

2-5

64.3%
(9)

35.7%
(5)

100.0%
(14)

28.6%
(4)

71.4%
(10)

100.0%
(14)

(32)

(15)

(47)

(15)

(32)

(47)

TOTAL NO
*Number of suspects interviewed.

These relationships, except with respect to education, go in the
direction which is consistent with the prevailing assumptions, but the
relationships do not appear to be very strong. A few suspects may
be in a slightly better position to assert their constitutional rights
because of age or previous experience with the criminal justice
system; but there is no basis here to assert that they generally have
a significant advantage. Also, it is not clear whether the slightly
better performance of the suspects with more arrests and felony
convictions can be attributed to greater knowledge of their rights,
psychological advantages, more experience, a generally defiant attitude,
or a combination of these factors.
3. Effect of Promises and Threats: Inducements to Waive
Constitutional Rights
It can be argued that knowledge is not ordinarily the most
crucial variable in human decisionmaking. Most of our conduct and
a large part of our decisionmaking may be controlled more by such
factors as conditioning, instinct, and what we believe is expected
of us. If most human decisions are influenced more heavily by these
factors than by the thought processes, then it may be chimerical and
deluding to expect the suspect to capitalize on his knowledge of
rights. If anything, less rationality should be expected of him because
he is in a high-pressure, crisis-laden situation which is hardly con-
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ducive to rational decisionmaking. 57 Perhaps what is required during
interrogation under these conditions is close knowledge of the institutions and personalities of the criminal justice system, and few of the
suspects had or could be expected to have had the benefit of this kind
of knowledge.5"
If the knowledge communicated to the suspect by the Miranda
warning is inadequate to protect his rights and not a useful asset
to him during the interrogation, and if the knowledge, attitudes, or
temperament which come with age and experience have only a
slightly more significant impact on the suspect's decision to talk, then
perhaps the psychological pressures of the interrogation room of
which the Miranda Court spoke are still operative as the major factors
effecting the suspect's decision to talk. These psychological tactics
and strategies were clearly deemed by the Court to constitute compulsion within the meaning of the fifth amendment.59 Insofar as they
involve direct promises and threats, they also violate the common law
doctrine prohibiting promises and threats and later rules having the
same effect. ° The psychological tactics and strategies of the police
will be discussed in a later section of this article.6 ' This section will
discuss briefly, from the suspect's point of view, the promises and
threats which served as inducements to them to waive their constitutional rights and talk.
To the extent that the suspects' answers were credible in this
regard, the results of the interviews with the suspects at the Denver
County Jail indicate that promises and threats are frequently used
by the interrogators at the Denver Police Department as a means to
secure statements and confessions from the suspects and are occasionally used to induce them to sign the waiver provision of the
warning form.62 Half of the suspects who had been questioned at
the Denver Police Department (23 out of 46) described specific
statements made by their interrogators which can be classified as
promises and threats. For example, many of the suspects at the
Denver County Jail claimed that they had been told that if they
did not talk or sign the waiver form they would be charged with
more serious crimes. Specific illustrations of promises and threats
67Miranda-type warnings cannot "eliminate whatever 'inherently coercive atmosphere' the
police station may have." Interrogations,supra note 36 at 1613.
58 Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 655-56 (1967). See also Faculty Note, supra note 52.
59 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
60 Courts have often held that the use of promises and threats as inducements to confess
violates the voluntariness standard. 3 WIGMORE, EVMENCE §§ 825-26 (3d ed. 1940);
Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 954-84 (1966).
61 See text, § III infra.
62 Specific examples of promises and threats reported by the suspects are presented in
Appendix A infra.
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reported are presented in Appendix A infra. Thirty-one percent of
the suspects (six out of 19)

explicitly mentioned the promises and

threats when they were asked to describe their primary reasons for
talking to the police. Specific illustrations of these and other reasons
for talking to the police are presented in Appendix B infra. At least
in these cases the influence of the inducements on the suspects'
decisions to talk appears to have been substantial.
The significance of the existence of promises and threats in the
interrogcation process cannot be overstated. First, the use of promises
and threats in interrogation clearly constitutes compulsion within the
meaning of the fifth amendment and can effectively preclude the
effective exercise of both the privilege against self-incrimination and
the right to counsel in interrogation."3
Second, the use of such tactics violates the doctrine of voluntariness which has traditionally been applied in determining the admis64
sibility of a confession. As early as 1783 in King v. Warickshall,
an English court held that confessions which are obtained in consequence of promises or threats may not be admitted into evidence. 6"
In 1897 in Brain v. United States,"' the United States Supreme Court
stated that,
a confession in order to be admissible must be free and voluntary;
that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor

obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the

exertion of any improper influence. . . .A confession can never be
received in evidence where the prisoner has been influenced by any
threat or promise; for the law cannot measure the force of the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner,
and therefore67excludes the declaration if any degree of influence has
been exerted.
Although the Court's later conclusion that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination "was but a crystallization of the

doctrine as to confessions," 6

has been called simply erroneous,6 9

nevertheless, promises and threats violate both the common law
doctrine of voluntariness and the more recent interpretations of the
fifth amendment. 7 °
One can gain additional insight into the effects of promises and
threats in the interrogation room if he compares their use to the
6aSee Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964)

and cases cited therein; F. INBAU &

REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 191-94 (1967);
THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 11 (1967). See also text, § II(D) infra.
64 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783).
65

1d. at 235.

66168 U.S. 532 (1897).
67

Id. at 542-43 (quoting from 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed.)).

68Id. at 543.

69 Developments in the Law - Confessions, supra note 60, at 960.
70 See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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widespread practice of plea bargaining. 7 In plea bargaining 72a
promise of leniency is traded for the suspect's act of self-conviction,
and there is a general consensus that this sort of bargaining must
be upheld.73 The prosecutor makes an offer to the defense attorney
that if the suspect is willing to waive his right to trial and plead
guilty, the severity of the criminal process will be reduced. In both
"the interrogation room bargain" and the normal plea bargain a
legal right is forborne for an apparent benefit to the suspect. The
cost to the suspect in some instances may be the same-if he makes
a very damaging statement to the interrogator in response to a
promise, in effect, he may be convicting himself.
Nevertheless, there are important differences between plea bargaining as commonly practiced and the sort of bargaining that occurs
in the interrogation room. The surface similarities between the processes are quickly dispelled when they are evaluated in terms of the
protections which they offer the suspect. In the case of plea bargaining
the suspect is ordinarily represented by counsel, who in most instances
71

7

7

The practice of plea bargaining is generally acknowledged as being one of the most
significant processes in our administration of criminal justice. For a detailed discussion
DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
of the process, see D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION -THE
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966). See generally materials cited in NEWMAN, Id. at
78 n. 1: M. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUsTICE, 24-29, 85-87 (1961) ; Dash, Cracks in the
Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385 (1951); Miller, The Compromise
of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927); Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 780 '(1956) ; Polstein, How
to "Settle" a Criminal Case, 8 PRAC. LAW. 35 (1962) ; Weintraub & Tough, Lesser Pleas
Considered, 32 J. CalM. L.C. & P.S. 506 (1942); Vetri, Compromises by Prosecutors to
Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964); Comment, Official Inducements to
Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Marketplace, 32 U. CHI. L. RE1. 167, 181 (1964).
The types of leniency take various forms. In Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain justice, 46 J. CIUM. L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956), the author
categorized the types into four main groups: (1) charge reduction; (2) sentence
reduction; (3) concurrent charges; (4) dropped charges. Id. at 787. Besides the four
major groups there are innumerable variations, some of which are listed in Vetri, Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964). The
author stated:
Many other types of agreements are made with defendants to induce a
plea. These include promises not to prosecute co-defendants, promises to
arrange for the defendant or co-defendant to be incarcerated in a particular
prison, promises to have the defendant or co-defendant tried in a juvenile court,
recommendations for pre-sentence investigations, . . . and agreements not to
oppose probation. Promise of immunity by the prosecutor can also be used
to induce guilty pleas. Immunity can be promised with respect to some crimes
in order to obtain a plea on another crime. Technically, immunity promises
come within the scope of a promise to dismiss charges in an indictment, but
often the immunity relates to crimes not yet charged.
Id. at 866 n.7.
Sheer pragmatic considerations such as costs, personnel, facilities, and time dictate
that the process must continue. See, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir.
1957). The procedure is not without its problems, however, as noted by Freedman,
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions 64 MIcH L. REV. 1469 (1966): "[I1t is common knowledge that plea bargaining
frequently results in improper guilty pleas by innocent people. For example, a defendant
falsely accused of robbery may plead guilty to simple assault, rather than risk a robbery
conviction and a substantial prison term." Id. (emphasis added). See Comment, Official
Inducements to Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Marketplace, 32 U. CHI. L. REv.
167, 181 (1964).
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is able to distinguish between good and bad bargains."4 Generally,
tie defense attorney will evaluate the prosecution's authority and can
more realistically appraise the credibility of the promised benefit.
Another protection for the suspect in this process is that the prosecution and the defense counsels often have a working relationship
which may act to deter the prosecution from fully exploiting the
mistakes of his adversary. Finally, after an agreement has been
reached and approved by the court, it becomes enforceable. 5
In contrast, the suspect who bargains in the interrogation room
has none of these protections. He may not even be cognizant that
he is in a bargaining situation and that the cost of the promised
benefit is the relinquishment of a constitutional right. In many cases
he cannot effectively distinguish between good and bad bargains and
cannot evaluate the credibility of the threat or promise. He probably
has no working relationship with the interrogator, 76 and his adversary
may exploit his ignorance with impunity. Most importantly, the
agreement which is reached in the interrogation room has not been
sanctioned by the court and is unenforceable. Proving that it ever
took place may be impossible for the suspect.
If the suspect is to have the kind of effective right to counsel
which was envisioned by the Miranda court, he should not be asked
to "make a deal" with his interrogator nor be frightened or threatened into doing so. He should not be treated as if he were his own
counsel, nor should he be distracted from his right to have counsel
present during the questioning. The interrogation room is a singularly
inappropriate place for bargaining and only the most exceptional
suspect is qualified to engage in the bargaining process. Furthermore,
when the suspect is induced (either consciously or subconsciously) to
bargain away his right to counsel, his fifth amendment privilege
77
becomes impaired and ineffectual.
The results of this study appear to indicate that despite the
stringent common law rule prohibiting promises and threats and later
rules having the same effect,78 police interrogators still resort to

these tactics regularly. The continued presence of promises and threats
74

A survey conducted by Newman reported in 46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956)7
supra note 72, revealed that approximately 50 percent of his sample were represented
by counsel. Of the other half, almost 50 percent of them were recidivists and had at
least some experience with the plea bargaining process. That, to some extent, would
vitiate the necessity for them to have counsel to interpret and distinguish the "good and
bad bargains."
75
See, e.g., United States ex el McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963);
United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 258 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; People v.
Cassiday, 90 Ill. App. 2d 132, 232 N.E.2d 795 (1967).
76 "Local" recidivists, however, may be an exception to this condition. See Newman, supra
note 72, at 784.
77 See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
78 See note 60 & text accompanying notes 63-70 supra.
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in the interrogation rooms of the Denver Police Station can probably
best be attributed to the difficulties in proving that they were ever
made. The problems of proof and reconstructing the events of the
interrogation room will be examined later in the study.7 9
D. Suspects and the Right to Counsel
The need for counsel in the interrogation room to protect the
suspect's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is apparent from the findings reported above. The knowledge imparted
to the suspect by the required warning appears to be insufficient to
protect the suspect from the psychological tactics and strategies of
the police - the 'inherently compelling pressures" of the interrogation room. Further, if promises and threats are to be employed,
they should be employed under the watchful eye of an attorney, or
mediated by an attorney who is familiar with the rules of the game
and more able to negotiate a conscionable bargain.
Because in Miranda the Court itself realized the insufficiency
of a warning alone to protect the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, it held that the right to have counsel present at
the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the suspect's
rights.8 °
The most apparent possible problem with the Court's holding
in this regard is that the means adopted to protect the right to counsel
in the interrogation room is the same device which was to be employed to protect the privilege against self-incrimination -a
warning
to the suspect advising him of his rights."' If a rights warning is
insufficient to protect one right (as the Court admits and this study
confirms), it is possible that a similar warning would be insufficient
to protect the other right.
In order to ascertain whether or not the warnings adequately
apprised the suspects of their right to counsel, they were asked whether
or not they were cognizant at the time of questioning that they had
the right to see counsel before questioning and have him present during questioning. A surprisingly large 73 percent indicated that they
were cognizant of the right to counsel, although only approximately
one-half of the suspects remembered the right to counsel when they
were asked to state their recollections of the warnings. Furthermore,
10 percent of the suspects who stated that at the time of interrogation
they did not realize that they had the right to have counsel sit in
during interrogation claimed that they asked to see an attorney before
79See text, § IV infra.
80
See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
81See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
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questioning anyway. They appeared to have picked up enough from
the warnings to attempt to exercise a right which they did not fully
understand.
Thus it appears that most of the suspects were aware of their
sixth amendment right as it applied to interrogation. (The data suggest, however, that this was due not necessarily to the warnings in
many cases, but to the suspects' prior knowledge of their rights.)
It might be inferred that they were capable of exercising the right
to counsel.
Yet, 67 percent of the suspects asserted that they had requested
the presence of counsel during questioning while only 6 percent indicated that they were given the benefit of counsel .1 2 Although it might be
wise to view this latter statistic with some skepticism (since a few
of the suspects who were interviewed prior to trial may have perceived
this information as directly related to the defense of their case), the
statistic suggests that the police are able to somehow effectively frustrate the right to counsel, despite the suspects' knowledge of their
rights and their attempts to assert them.
One obvious tactic which is readily available to the police to
counter the suspects' knowledge or attempts to assert their right to
counsel is to induce the suspect to waive his right to counsel while
at the same time obtaining sufficient evidence to prove that the waiver
was "knowing and intelligent."8 In order to elucidate to some extent
the nature of the suspects' waivers of their right to counsel, consideration will be given to the interesting and enigmatic decisions made by
the 16 percent of the suspects who stated that they knew that the law
gave them the right to counsel during interrogation, but they decided
not to exercise that right. Ostensibly, these suspects made "knowing
and intelligent waivers" of the right to counsel; but before reaching
that conclusion, one should look at the factors which influenced their
decisions.
It has been suggested that the reason suspects who know of the
right to counsel do not request the presence of counsel before interrogation is that they have had previous experiences with incompetent
lawyers.84 While many of the suspects were critical of the quality of
legal representation which they had experienced in previous cases,
none of them suggested that they preferred not to have counsel. Every
suspect interviewed appeared to feel that in most situations any lawyer
is better than none at all.
Of these three suspects (6%), one was questioned by the FBI and one by the Colorado
Springs police.
8 Other tactics available to the police are discussed in § III infra.
84 The suggestion was made by Professor Robert 0. Dawson, University of Texas School
of Law, as a possible hypothesis for this study.
82
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The reason cited by four of the suspects for not exercising their
sixth amendment right was that although they knew that they theoretically had a legal right to counsel, they felt that the police would
not call a lawyer even if they requested one. Their own previous experiences and those of their friends had taught them that it would be an
exercise in futility. One of the suspects indicated that he could not
afford his own lawyer and felt that the police would not call the
public defender's office for him. Although he was not certain that
the police never call lawyers for nonindigent suspects, he stated that
there was no chance that a lawyer would be called to assist an indigent.
An explanation given by three suspects was that calling a lawyer
would slow things up. Two of the suspects referred specifically to the
cramped and uncomfortable conditions (no showers) at the city jail
and felt that if they did not call a lawyer, they would get to the more
habitable county jail sooner. The other indicated that he thought he
would be released soon because the evidence against him was not
strong enough to prosecute, and waiting for a lawyer would delay
the process.
Two of the suspects contended that the reason they did not exercise the right to counsel was the fear that the interrogators would
think that they were "wise guys" and police discretionary powers
would be used against them. In one case the suspect asserted that the
interrogator tried to dissuade him from calling a lawyer by telling
him that although he had the right to a lawyer, he'd be smarter if
he didn't call one. According to this suspect, the interrogator said
that "a lawyer would be expensive; he'd tell you that you could beat
this charge, but you can't." Both of the suspects explicitly stated that
they did not want to do anything which would make the interrogators
angry.
The other three suspects had three distinct explanations for their
conduct. One felt that his conscience demanded that he talk immediately without waiting for a lawyer; so he didn't bother to ask for one.
One stated that he didn't expect to say anything under any circumstances. As a result, he believed, a lawyer could not give him any
additional protection at that stage. And finally, one suspect who was
told that he was being charged with assault didn't want to bother with
a request for a lawyer because the charges were not serious. (The
victim died the next day and the charges were changed to voluntary
manslaughter.)
All of these suspects except one had signed the waiver provision
and all of them knew about the right to counsel and when it attaches.
None had asked for a lawyer. Judges would probably find "knowing
and intelligent waivers" in each of these cases, but it is submitted that
most of them are inappropriate for such a finding.
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The waiver should not apply to the first situation where the suspects knew their "theoretical" rights but felt they would be of no
practical value. The second situation is not appropriate for the waiver
because an entirely collateral matter (the condition of city jail) determined the outcome rather than any intelligent consideration of the
options which were available. Where the suspects were obviously
intimidated by their interrogators, their decision could not be "knowing
and intelligent"; and the suspect who was told that he was charged
with assault rather than voluntary manslaughter was in no position
to exercise his rights because he had no realistic conception of the
consequences of his decision.
The theory of the waiver may be consistent with only a few of
the actual decisions. The suspect who thought he was not going to
say anything anyway and the suspect who thought that the police did
not have enough to prosecute, irrespective of the ultimate validity of
these assertions, may have given their decisions the kind of attention
that the Miranda court envisioned. Waivers arguably could be found
here.
Whether a "knowing and intelligent waiver" took place in the case
of the suspect whose conscience demanded that he talk immediately
is a debatable question. On the one hand, his mental processes were
never activated and there was no consideration of alternatives. On
the other hand, he indicated that under all circumstances conscience
would be his only guide and the presence of a lawyer would probably not have affected his conduct during interrogation. He deliberately chose to follow his conscience and stated that he would do so
again even if the consequences were a long jail sentence.
In most of these situations the suspects' knowledge of their rights
did not enable or encourage them to protect those rights in any meaningful way. To label their conduct "knowing and intelligent waivers"
merely because they knew their rights and did not attempt to exercise
them is to rely on a fiction that is questionable in light of the actual
decisionmaking process. Judicial standards must be applicable to specific factual settings and should not gloss over and obscure the events
which transpire in the interrogation rooms.
If the courts are incapable of determining the subjective factors
which actually influence the suspects' choices, then they should explicitly recognize their inability to do so. The problem may be that
"the knowing and intelligent waiver" test purports to be subjective
as well as objective, but it may be applied only objectively. One cannot
tell what went on in a suspect's mind by looking at his signature on
a form or even by asking him whether or not he knew his rights. The
decisionmaking process is much too complex to be treated with such
vacuous formalism.
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The treatment of the right to counsel should include the police
response to the exercise of the right as well as the decision to exercise
it. The suspect's description of the police conduct should be examined
critically. Its value is that it gives some insight into his attitudes toward the police and an account of what happened in the interrogation
room. That the account may be highly partisan does not suggest that
it should be dismissed summarily.
Eighteen of the suspects who indicated that they had requested
counsel before or during interrogation were asked to describe the
response of the police to their requests. One had been questioned by
the FBI, one by the Colorado Springs police in Colorado Springs, and
the remaining 16 had all been questioned by the Denver police at the
Denver Police Station. Both the suspect who was interrogated by the
FBI and the one questioned by the Colorado Springs police indicated
that interrogation ended immediately after their requests for counsel
were made. Attorneys were contacted, and, after they had arrived, the
interrogations were continued.
In contrast, most of the suspects who were questioned at the
Denver Police Department were much more critical of the treatment
which they received. Fourteen of them stated that interrogation continued after their requests for counsel; no counsel ever appeared, and
to their knowledge no effort was made to contact an attorney on their
behalf. Some claimed that they were coaxed to talk even after they
had unequivocally stated that they would not do so until they had
spoken with an attorney. Many of these suspects asserted that the
interrogators ignored their requests for counsel, and a few claimed
that the interrogators actively tried to discourage them from exercising the right by insisting that an attorney would be of no assistance
to them or it would "just slow things up."
The 15th case is deserving of a brief separate explanation. The
suspect alleged that he indicated at the inception of his first interrogation that he would not talk or sign the waiver provision without
first consulting an attorney. He stated that he didn't have funds to
retain his own attorney and asked the interrogator to contact one for
him. The questioning ceased immediately and he claimed that he was
assured that a lawyer would be called to speak with him. Four days
passed. No attorney came.
On the fifth day he was taken into the interrogation room
again.8 5 When the suspect stated that no attorney had contacted him,
85 In Miranda the Court stated: "If the individual indicates in any manner, at an), time
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must
cease. . . . If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
Quaere whether or not a re-interrogation in this situation in and of itself constitutes
a violation of Miranda.
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the interrogator acted surprised.8 6 However, without making any effort
to contact one, he asked the suspect if he had changed his mind and
had decided to sign the waiver provision and talk. The suspect was
tired of sitting around the jail. So he wrote out and signed a confession for burglary. This was his first arrest and first interrogation
experience.
In only one case did a suspect who was questioned at the Denver
Police Department state that the police complied with his request for
an attorney. The questioning stopped immediately after the request.
It was not continued until after the suspect had had the opportunity
to consult with counsel.
While the suspects' descriptions may not be taken at face value,
there is some support for them. Two of the attorneys at the Denver
Public Defender's office stated that although calls regularly come
into the Public Defender's office in response to requests for the presence of counsel at lineups, the office is seldom called to furnish
counsel to be present during interrogations.8 7
There are two possible explanations for the willingness of the
Denver police to call the Public Defender's office to furnish counsel
for lineups and their reluctance to do so for interrogation. The first
is that the role of counsel during identification proceedings is passive,
whereas counsel at interrogation can act immediately to determine the
outcome. The suspect must appear in the lineup, and a lawyer cannot
advise him not to do so. If counsel feels that the lineup is unfair, he has
no means to correct that situation at the police station. Furthermore, at
the Denver Police Station, counsel at a lineup identification was not
until recently even permitted to hear the remarks of the witness when
he makes the identification, although knowledge of these remarks
would often benefit him in cross-examination."8 While counsel's role
at a lineup is exclusively observational, a lawyer can exercise an immediate and decisive influence over the outcome of interrogation by advising his client not to make a statement.
A second explanation for police willingness to contact counsel
for lineups and their reluctance to contact Miranda counsel is that the
86Joe Quinn of the Public Defender's Office suggests three possible explanations of this
situation: (1) The suspect was not taken before a county judge pursuant to Rule 5 of
the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, with the intent or effect of gaining psychological advantage over the suspect. (2) The suspect was taken before a county judge for
a judicial advisement, but no attorney was contacted for him. (3) A call was placed to
the Public Defender's Office by a matron at the city jail, but because of heavy workloads, the attorney on jail duty for that day did not respond to the call. Interview with
Joe Quinn, Assistant Public Defender, May 22, 1970, Office of the Colorado Public
Defender, Denver, Colorado.
87 Conversation with Bryan Morgan, Assistant Public Defender and Interview with Joe
Quinn, Assistant Public Defender, August 14, 1969, Office of the Public Defender.
Denver, Colorado.
88Braxton v. Phillips, No. 7514 (Dist. Ct. Denver, Oct. 2, 1968) (Public Defender's
office obtained an injunction prohibiting police from conducting lineups unless and
until defense attorneys were allowed to hear the remarks of witnesses).
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judiciary has used much more stringent standards in overseeing the
implementation of United States v. Wade 9 than Miranda. If counsel
is not present at a lineup, the Colorado district court judges have
shown a strong inclination to exclude the identification from evidence. In contrast, the absence of counsel during interrogation is
ordinarily given little weight per se in determining the admissibility
of a statement.
The public defenders argue that efforts at interrogations by the
Denver police do not end merely because the suspect has expressed
his desire to see counsel before answering any questions."
At first blush it appeared that most of the suspects knew about
their right to counsel- it seems to follow that they can effectively
exercise it. On closer examination it becomes apparent that knowledge
of the existence of the right is not enough. The first difficulty is that
some of the suspects who knew about the existence of the right did
not try to exercise it. A consideration of the factors which influenced
their decisions leads to the conclusion that many of the decisions were
affected by the kinds of psychological pressures that the Supreme
Court hoped to exclude (or at least mitigate) from the interrogation
room through the implementation of Miranda.
A second problem is that, to the extent that the suspects' descriptions are credible, the Denver Police Department often frustrates the
exercise of the right to counsel even after the suspect has tried to
assert it. From the suspects' point of view, they were dependent upon
the police to protect their sixth amendment right, and the police exploited this dependency. Most of the suspects could protect their right
to counsel, if anywhere, only in the courtroom since the court could
suppress a statement by resorting to the exclusionary rule. Few of the
suspects believed that the right to counsel was of much value to them
in the interrogation rooms of the Denver Police Station.9 '
E. Knowing and Intelligent I'aiver of Constitutional Rights
After holding that the right to counsel is indispensable to the
protection of the privilege against self-incrimination (and that the
suspect must accordingly be further warned of the right to counsel),
the Court in Miranda held that if the interrogation continues in the
absence of counsel, a heavy burden rests upon the prosecution to establish a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of both the privilege against
89 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
90

See note 87 supra.

91 However, one sophisticated suspect, who was interviewed in connection with the Wash-

ington, D. C. study of Miranda, would rather protect his right to counsel only in the
courtroom. He observed, "I wouldn't want [a lawyer in the interrogation room]. That's
the worst place to have a lawyer because the police play it straight then. I wanted them
to make a mistake." Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 49, at 1378.
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self-incrimination and the right to counsel.9 The results of this study
suggest that knowing and intelligent waivers of the privilege against
self-incrimination do not occur very often among suspects because the
knowledge of rights imparted by the warning is not extensive and not
sufficient to allow the suspect to effectively exercise the privilege.
The data further suggest that knowing and intelligent waivers of the
right to counsel are not extremely prevalent among suspects because
a large number of them claim to have had this right frustrated by
the police, and many of those who admit to having waived the right
did so apparently because of psychological pressures. Yet the great
majority of suspects interviewed had signed the waiver of rights provision which is included on the rights warning form. Some of the
information collected in the interviews sheds light on the question
of why so many suspects were willing to sign the waiver of rights
provision. The suspects were asked whether or not the signing of the
waiver form (in either place on the form) could have any legal effect.
The purpose here was to determine the general impressions of the
suspect with respect to the nature of the form and the degree of significance which they probably attached to it during the interrogation.
The question was intentionally open ended and may have been somewhat ambiguous.9 3
To the extent that their responses to the question reflected their
actual impressions of the significance of the form, the suspects' perceptions of the form were for the most part astonishingly naive.
Approximately 60 percent of the suspects thought that under no circumstances could their signatures on it have any legal effect. 94
The majority of the suspects appeared to have substantially underrated the significance of signing the warning form. Fifty-four percent
of all of them stated that they signed both parts of the form including
the waiver of rights provision, and 21 percent did not even remember
whether they had signed the form or not. It was inferred from their
comments about the form and their conduct that they saw it as a
merely mechanical device - a formality. Relatively few of the suspects distinguished between the first provision which indicated only
that they had been warned and the second which indicated that they
92 See note 28 & text accompanying note
93

9

10 supra.
While its ambiguity may have been problematic for the suspects, it was felt that a
more specific and precise question with respect to the legal effect of the form might
lead the suspects to consider issues which they had not considered during interrogation.
The latter evil seemed to be greater than the former. As a protective measure, if the
suspects appeared to be bothered by the ambiguity of the question and seemed to associate any possible legal significance with the form, their responses were recorded in such
a manner as to indicate that they believed that a signature on it could have a legal effect.
The presence or absence of signatures on the form is very frequently given determinative
weight by the judges in Miranda hearings in deciding whether or not to admit the
defendant's statement. See text, at 44 infra & Neitz v. People, 462 P.2d 498 (Colo.
1969) (illustrating the significance of the waiver form).
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were voluntarily choosing to waive the privilege against self-incrimination. When this distinction was brought to their attention, most
appeared to be confronting it for the first time.
Twenty-five percent of the suspects stated that they refused to
sign either any place on the form or one of its provisions. A few
indicated that the reason they refused to do so was because of possible
legal significance. However, it also appeared that these suspects tended
to be much less cooperative in general than the others. Their entire
response to the interrogation process was different. As indicated in
Table 6, those who refused to sign both provisions or only one provision were much less likely to make any statement or confession than
those who did not.
TABLE

6

Signing of Waiver Form and Making of a Statement or Confession
Made Statement*
Signed Waiver Form

Yes

Yes

81.0%

No

20.0%
(2)

(17)

TOTAL N.

(19)

No

19.0%

(4)

Made Confessiont
Total

100.0%

(21)

Yes

52.4%

(11)

80.0%
(8)

100.0%
(10)

10.0%
(1)

(12)

(31)

(12)

No

Total

47.6%

100.0%

(10)

(21)

90.0%
(9)

100.0%
(0)

(19)

(31)

tNumber of suspects interviewed.
*Chi Square significant at .002 level.
tChi Square significant at .025 level.

In sum, those who sign the waiver form generally do not understand the nature of their act, and those who refuse to sign are less
cooperative generally in their interrogations. The effect of a signed
waiver form on the judicial determination of "knowing and intelligent
waiver" will be considered later in this report. 5
Il1.

THE POLICE RESPONSE TO

Miranda: THEIR

ATTITUDES

AND CONDUCT IN THE INTERROGATION ROOM

Although Miranda may have been intended ultimately to effect
the nature of the suspect's role in the interrogation room, the decision
addressed itself directly to the conduct of the police with respect to
the suspect. Basically, the police are required to warn the suspect of
his fifth and sixth amendment rights as they apply to the interrogation process, and if the interrogation continues in the absence of
counsel, the prosecution must assume the heavy burden of establishing that the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived both his right
to remain silent and his right to counsel." The purpose of these
95 Id. See also text, § IV(B) infra.

9 See text accompanying notes 3-10 supra.
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requirements was purportedly to allow the suspect to overcome or
effectively counter the police strategies and tactics which are designed
to elicit a statement or confession from the suspect- the inherently
compelling pressures of the interrogation room. The purpose of this
section will be to examine the police response to the Miranda requirements in terms of their attitudes, goals, strategies and tactics in the
interrogation game.
A. Methodology
In order to gain insight into the police conduct of interrogations,
two brief, informal interviews were conducted with interrogators of
the Denver Police Department. More specifically, these interviews
were designed to elicit information with respect to the goals of the
interrogators and their attitudes toward the use of psychological tactics
and strategies to accomplish these goals. The purpose of the interrogation room observations which followed was to confirm the existence
of the goals, strategies, and tactics which were implied by the attitudes
of the police, and to examine the nature and effect of the strategies
and tactics in action. 7
Since it was possible for the observer to sit in on only eight
interrogations, the experience inside the interrogation room was quite
limited and serves only as a means to suggest some of the problems
which arise there. 8 Furthermore, the eight interrogations which were
witnessed may not have been entirely representative. None of them
involved extremely serious felonies, such as murder and rape. Among
the charges which had been filed on these suspects were assault on
a police officer, attempted burglary, robbery, and assault with a deadly
weapon. Also, two of the cases involved family disturbances. As a
result, it is possible that the interrogators did not press for confessions
as hard as in some other instances in which the charges were more
severe.
Before each of the eight interrogations the observer was introduced to the interrogator by his division chief as a student who had
a Ford Foundation grant to study the criminal justice process. In five
instances the interrogators were friendly and receptive and appeared
not be inhibited by the observer's presence. In three cases, however,
the interrogators appeared to be annoyed with the prospect of having
their work observed. Although none of them voiced an immediate
protest to their superiors, apparently two of them later expressed mis97 These investigations were conducted during July and August, 1969.
98 In Denver, unlike New Haven, the police and district attorney's office do not have an

open door policy with respect to observation by outsiders. They permitted the observations for only a short time and even then, with some reluctance. The position taken by
the district attorney's office was that the presence of an outsider in the interrogation
room interferes with the rights of the suspect.
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givings to their division chief about the wisdom of allowing the observations. Furthermore, unlike the New Haven study,99 the observations
at the Denver Police Station did not last long enough for the interrogators to become familiar with the observor and accustomed to his
presence. Thus, it is quite possible that their conduct during the questioning was inhibited by the presence of an outsider.
In each instance the observer and interrogator (in a few cases
two interrogators) entered the room together. They sat with the
suspect at a table and were similarly attired. The observer was introduced to the suspect only by name, and the suspect was not informed
that an outsider was present. Nor was the suspect asked whether or
not he would permit the observation. From all indications, the suspect
probably viewed the observer as another policeman. While the conduct of the interrogator may have been influenced by the presence of
a third party, it appears highly unlikely that there was any such imfluence on the suspect.
B. Police Attitudes Toward Interrogation
Some of the literature which has been written about the police
discusses their dissatisfaction with the judiciary - particularly the
United States Supreme Court.' 00 According to Albert Reiss and David
Bordua, the police view court decisions to dismiss charges against a
defendant as a rejection of their own decisions.'' The individual
policeman, being production-oriented, views an acquittal as his own
failure within the police system, or he may feel that the refusal of
the courts to convict rests on the most artificial of formalities.'
Finally, Reiss and Bordua contend that the displacement of the
policeman's position of authority when he testifies in court, "plus
the generalized lower prestige of police when taken together with
the institutionalized distrust of police built into the trial process
creates a situation where the police not only feel themselves balked
by the courts but perhaps, even more fundamentally, feel themselves
03
dishonored."'
The discussions at the Denver Police Station appear to confirm
the existence of the policeman's dissatisfaction with the judiciary. For
instance, one assistant division chief contends that in cases since
99For a description of the Yale study, in which the observers in the New Haven Police

Station gradually developed a close rapport with the New Haven police, see Interrogations, supra note 36, at 1531-32.
100 See, e.g., Reiss & Bordua, Environment and Organization:A Perspective on the Police, in
THE POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS 25, 32-40 (D. Bordua ed. 1967); J. WILSON,
VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 52 (1968).

101 Reiss & Bordua, supra note 100, at 33.
102 id. at 37.
10 3

Id. at 39.
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Gideon,10 4 the United States Supreme Court has gone much too far
in extending the procedural rights of the suspects. He is particularly
critical of the court's extension of the right to counsel at the pretrial
stages because he feels that when it is exercised, it interferes with
"proper" law enforcement. He believes that the effect of having
counsel present is to suppress the truth, since lawyers generally advise
their clients not to say anything, and that the extension of the right
to counsel in the interrogation room is just one instance in which the
Supreme Court has displayed excessive concern with individual rights
and a great insensitivity to the needs of society.
A number of the interrogators were questioned informally with
regard to their goals and strategies during the interrogation period.
The interrogators uniformly appeared to be concerned with accomplishing two goals. The first was to get the suspect to sign the waiver
provision after warning him of his rights, and the second was to get
him to talk whenever possible. A few of them indicated that if a
suspect is reluctant to sign the form or to talk, then it would be permissible to give him some mild encouragement to do so. They felt
that various incentives might be legitimately used to accomplish their
objectives but did not specify exactly the kinds of encouragement
which are permissible. The interrogators unanimously believed that
the warnings must be given in order to have the statement admitted
into evidence at trial. However, once that duty has been fulfilled,
some of them felt that they have wide latitude in inducing the suspect
to waive his rights.
For the most part, they appeared to have adopted the same attitudes as the authors of the police interrogation manuals, but their
strategies were not as highly developed." °5 The manuals suggest a
systematic analysis of the suspect's emotional state and a concerted
intellectual effort to develop specialized strategies for manipulating
his emotions. According to the manuals, the interrogator's objective
should be to elicit incriminating statements after crumbling the defenses of the suspect."0 ' Among the tactics prescribed to accomplish
this goal are the following: calling attention to the subject's physiological and psychological symptoms of guilt, Mutt and Jeff routines,
building the subject up and tearing him down, bluffing, compounding
falsehoods, confusing the suspect with kindness, and other tactics
based on "indirect emotional subterfuge."'0 7
104

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

105 See

generally F. INBAU &

J.

REID, CRIMINAL

INTERROGATION

AND

CONFESSIONS

(1967); A. AUBRY & R. CAPUTO, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (1965).
106AUBRY & CAPUTO, supra note 105, at 31.
107 For a comprehensive description of prescribed police strategies and tactics in the interrogation room. see generally INBAU, supra note 105, and AUBRY & CAPUTO, note 105, at
75-99.
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While the Denver police interrogators often appeal to the suspects' emotions through sympathy, kindness or anger, they seem to
rely more on "common sense" psychology than on the kind of systematic analysis and subtle psychological strategy which is suggested by
the manuals. Although their tactics are neither as specialized nor as
sophisticated as those presented in the manuals, they know how to
get what they want from the suspect during interrogation.
The strategy of one interrogator differed at least in one respect
from the police manuals. While the manuals indicate the crucial importance of a confession or admission,' 08 he was generally satisfied
when he could get any statement from the suspect which could be
used for impeachment in court. He further indicated that he is willing
to exert some pressure when he believes that he needs the evidence
for conviction but will "go easier" when there is sufficient evidence
to convict without it. When a confession is definitely needed for a
conviction, he is especially careful to encourage the suspect to sign
the waiver provision. Once he gets the waiver signature, he attempts
to induce the suspect to forget about the warnings by asking simple
questions which few suspects find objectionable such as age, address,
and phone number. Only after the suspect has been distracted from
his rights, does he ask about the facts of the alleged crime.
The interrogators all appeared to recognize the value of using
common sense" psychology in the interrogtion room. Although they
never spoke in terms of the complex psychological theories articulated
in the police manuals, they felt it was very important to be sensitive
to the particular forces which were working on the suspect.""9 They
stated that they thought sympathy tactics in many situations are especially successful in getting the suspects to talk. One indicated that he
likes to impugn the character of the victim in some crimes against the
person cases because this "helps the suspect justify his actions to himself and makes him more willing to discuss them." Another indicated
that he tries to present himself as the suspect's "friend" because he
often is able to get better results, particularly with inexperienced
suspects.
C. Observationsin the Interrogation Room
The purpose of the observations in the interrogation room was
to confirm the existence of the goals, strategies and tactics which were
implied by the attitudes of the police and to examine the nature and
effect of the strategies and tactics in action. In order to illustrate the
108 Cf. AUBRY & CAPUTO, Supra note 104, at 21.
109

For more subtle psychological strategies in the interrogation room, see generally AuBRY
& CAPUTO, supra note 105, at 75.
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findings, a few of the eight interrogations which were observed will
be described in some detail.
On June 26, 1969, a Spanish-American suspect was questioned
regarding an attempted burglary. The suspect was in his early twenties
and had a long list of previous arrests. According to the interrogator,
the police had insufficient evidence to give them "probable cause"
on this charge, but the suspect was also being held on another charge
-

failure to appear.

Without encouragement, the suspect signed the waiver form, but
after what appeared to be momentary indecision, he stated that he
did not want to talk. The interrogator appeared to be interested in
assisting the suspect and spoke in a friendly tone. He made the following statement: "You're in jail now; if you want to talk, the entire
matter might be cleared up before your case gets to court." The suspect repeated his statement that he did not want to talk. At that point
the questioning ceased, and he was returned to his cell.
On June 27, 1969, an interrogator questioned an Eskimo charged
with assault with a deadly weapon. The suspect was alleged to have
stabbed his wife with a knife. He had no previous experience with
the criminal justice system, no previous arrests, and signed the waiver
form without any encouragement.
Immediately after the suspect signed the waiver form, the interrogator stated, "I would appreciate it very much if you would tell me
exactly what happened last night." Again, the interrogator's tone was
friendly and familiar. He suggested to the suspect that he often has
problems with his own wife. The suspect admitted that he had come
home drunk but denied that he had a knife and denied knowledge
of the stabbing. Despite this denial, the detective asked, "Where did
you have the knife?" The suspect repeated his previous answer.
After the interrogation the detective stated privately that he often
repeats questions which have been answered negatively, because it
sometimes "trips the suspect up" and gives the interrogator "a psychological advantage." He also indicated that he seldom has difficulty
in getting suspects in family disturbance cases to talk, because they
are almost invariably vulnerable to sympathy tactics and want to get
their problems off their chest. In this interrogation the suspect appeared to view the interrogator as a friend, and despite repeated questions and denials concerning the knife, he did not appear to recognize
the adversary nature of the relationship.
On June 30, 1969, a Spanish-American youth was questioned with
respect to an aggravated assault charge which had not been filed at the
time of questioning. The youth had been arrested a number of times
before and had a conviction of assault with a deadly weapon. Before
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the interrogation on the morning of the 30th, the suspect had twice
been warned of his rights. In each instance he had refused to sign
the waiver provision and had refused to talk. The interrogator asked
him for the third time whether he finally had decided "to cooperate"
by signing the form and talking. The suspect said that he had changed
his mind and was now willing to do so. He signed both provisions
of the advisement form.
In response to the interrogator's questions the suspect admitted
that he had had a gun on his person but denied that he had taken it
out of his pocket. The interrogator then asked the suspect the hypothetical question: "Would you ever shoot anyone?" The response was
that in some situations he would "possibly do so." The suspect also
volunteered the statement that the arresting detective had told another
detective who was present at the time of the arrest that he wanted
"to pin an aggravated assault rap on him and get him sent to jail for
a few years." When asked later why he did not record this statement
along with the others, the interrogator gave two reasons. First, "it was
a lie." Second, "it has no relevance to the facts."
In another interrogation which took place on June 30th, a suspect
charged with robbery refused to sign the waiver provision and asked
for a lawyer. The interrogator's response was that a lawyer wouldn't
help him and that he ought to be more cooperative. The suspect appeared to be intransigent, and the interrogator concluded that further
attempts to question him would be futile. The questioning ceased, and
the suspect was permitted to return to his cell.
The observations in the interrogation room of the Denver Police
Department were singularly unastounding - and certainly less dramatic than the practices described by the suspects at the County Jail.
Any possible legal defects involved (promises, threats, or even mild
encouragements) were so ambiguous or subtle that they possibly could
not be shown to have violated "due process" as that standard has been
traditionally interpreted.
However, certain observations can be made about the interrogators'
techniques. First, the interrogators seemed to be aware of and willing to
utilize various tactics to influence the suspect - to "encourage" him
to talk. One interrogator emphasized his own desire for the suspect
to speak with him. One suggested that it would help the suspect to
talk. Further, hypothetical questions were asked which were designed
to elicit incriminating answers.
A second observation is that the tactics used by the interrogators
were used not only to elicit statements, but were used also to accomplish the stated goal of obtaining waivers of rights from the suspects.
One suspect was presented with two additional warning forms after
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he had explicitly refused to sign the first, and he was asked three
times whether or not he wanted to talk. Another was advised that it
would be better not exercise the sixth amendment right to counsel.
Third, it appears that most interrogations are conducted "in private," without a witness present, and one of the interrogators recorded
only those parts of the suspect's statement which incriminated him
and omitted the exculpatory portion because "it was not relevant"
or "it was a lie."

That the use of these or any tactics at all was mild during the
observations, of course, leaves a significant question unanswered. However, there are two indications that an accurate picture of the use of
tactics and psychological pressures lies somewhere between what was
observed and what was reported by the suspects in the County Jail.
First, the cases were not very important, and a number of the interrogators explicitly stated afterwards that they did not care whether or
not the suspects talked. Second, there were some indications that a
few of the interrogators were inhibited by the presence of an outsider
and would have exerted more pressure in his absence. If this is the
case, then the practices described here may understate the severity of
the pressures exerted generally during interrogations at the Denver
Police Station.
IV. THE Miranda HEARING AND THE PROBLEMS OF PROOF

Thus far the focus has been on the interrogation room-an
attempt to describe and analyze the impact of Miranda on the roles
of the suspect and the interrogator in the interrogation process. However, the interrogation contest is often ultimately resolved in the courtroom. In Colorado the judge, during a private hearing in chambers.
makes a finding of fact and law with regard to the admissibility of
a statement or confession. If the court finds that the statement is
admissible, then it may be introduced into evidence, and the jury
determines the veight which will be given to it."' The Miranda
hearing thus serves as the only formal link between the events which
transpire in the interrogation room and the body of law designed to
control those events.
In order to examine to a limited extent the judicial response to
Airanda in Colorado and the relationship of that response to the
interrogation process, some Miranda hearings were observed.
A. Some Observations of a Miranda Hearing

In an article in the Columbia Lau, Review, Sheldon Elsen and
Arthur Rosett describe the events of typical Miranda hearings."' They
"0 Compton v. People, 444 P.2d 263, 266 (Colo. 1968).
M Elsen & Rosett, supra note 58.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VO0L. 4 7

assert that in most cases the prosecution will contend that the suspect
waived his rights, that he did so without any inducements, and that

his waiver was "knowing and intelligent."11' 2 According to Elsen and
Rosett, when the defendant takes issue with these allegations of the
prosecution and the testimony is conflicting, the defendant ordinarily
has little chance. One of the defendant's disadvantages will be his
criminal record in most cases,' 3 and the court will take judicial notice
of it. A second disadvantage is that the judges recognize that confessions are generally accurate, and a third is that judges face political
pressure to convict. The result is that when the allegations at the
hearings are "contradictory, ambiguous, or ambivalent" (as they frequently are), the judges are likely to decide in favor of the law
14
enforcement officials.
Too few suppression hearings were observed in this study to confirm or disconfirm the interpretations of Elsen and Rosett as they

apply to Colorado. However, the hearings which were observed suggest some of the possible problems inherent in the judicial response

to Miranda, and one hearing will be described for purposes of illustrating some of these problems.
Donald Everett Carroll was charged with murder and was tried
in the courtroom of Judge Robert Kingsley in August of 1969.115
Carroll was questioned at the Denver Police Station one morning at
2:30 a.m. shortly after he was picked up at a bar. During the subsequent Miranda hearing, he claimed that he had been intoxicated at
the time of questioning because he had consumed "approximately
fifteen drinks and some pills" during the evening. His interrogators

admitted that the defendant looked "as if he had done a lot of drinking," when questioned, but they denied that he was intoxicated.
The prosecution and the defense agreed that Carroll had refused
to sign the first Miranda form presented to him and that he had
stated that he did not want to talk. Carroll claimed that he requested
an attorney at that point, but his interrogators denied that any such
request had been made. Moreover, both sides agreed that after he
refused to sign the first warning form, Carroll was kept in the interrogation room for approximately 15 minutes. The prosecution claimed
that after this period of time had expired, Carroll on his own initiative decided that he wanted to talk and would sign the warning form.
When asked by the defense why the defendant was still sitting in the
112 Id. at 658-59.
113The criminal record is relevant to show that the defendant has prior experience with the

criminal justice system and therefore, probable knowledge of his rights.
& Rosett, supra note 58, at 659.
115 People v. Carroll, No. 60679 (Dist. Ct. Denver, August 2, 1969), appeal docketed.
No. 24461 (Sup. Ct. Colo., Nov. 4, 1969).
114 Elen
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interrogation room 15 minutes after he had refused to talk, the police
answered that they were filling out some papers.
The arguments for the defense were as follows: Carroll was
intoxicated when questioned. He had consumed 15 drinks before questioning and testified that he was drunk. Under rule 5(A) (2) of the
Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure he should have been brought
before a county judge before questioning to determine whether or not
he was intoxicated. ." 6 The suspect requested counsel before questioning. His statement on the first waiver form indicated that he didn't
want to talk. Once he stated that he refused to talk, he should have
been removed from the interrogation room. Finally, he was not informed that he was charged with murder when questioned.
Against the objection of the defense the prosecution was permitted to introduce Carroll's criminal record into evidence. The defense pointed out that all of Carroll's previous arrests had occurred
before Miranda had taken effect.'17 Judge Kingsley admitted the
record into evidence.
The court's finding was that there was "a knowing and intelligent
waiver" and that the statement of the defendant was admissible into
evidence. The court found that the suspect was not intoxicated when
he made the statement, and that the police had no duty to take him
before a county judge to decide this question. Judge Kingsley did not
believe that the suspect asked for counsel and felt that a 15-minute
detention in the interrogation room after the defendant had indicated
that he didn't want to make a statement was justified. Finally, he
found that there was no duty on the part of the police to inform the
suspect of the nature of the charges before questioning.
From a defense perspective, the conclusions of the court may
have been disconcerting, but even more problematic was the mechanical and cursory nature of the MAh'anda hearing itself. As soon as the
police witness had testified, it became a practical certainty that Carroll's statement would be admitted into evidence. (Both the public
defender and the district attorney indicated privately that at that point
the result became a foregone conclusion.) As often happens in the
Denver district courts, Judge Kingsley scolded the police interrogator
momentarily, but in his decisionmaking, he appeared to ignore the
issue of proper police conduct and Miranda's bearing on that issue.
His consideration did not appear to go beyond the defendant's signatures on the advisement form, the police testimony, and the defendant's criminal record.
116This provision was changed in the new Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure which
became effective April 1, 1970.
11 Thus, it is argued, no inference should arise that his previous experience with the
criminal justice system had given him a prior knowledge of his constitutional rights
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As with most Miranda hearings, Carroll's hearing did not clearly
violate any strictly legal standards. However, within the context of
the research findings concerning the actual interrogation process, it
will be asserted that the Miranda hearing is generally, for the suspect,
a kind of ritualistic formalism with a vacuous result.
B. The Miranda Hearing and the Interrogation Process

It has been said about Miranda that central to the decision was a
dissatisfaction with regard to the way the lower courts find the facts
which occurred in the interrogation room. The concern was that they
gave dubious police testimony excessive weight, and the hope was
that by defining standards more clearly, Miranda would mitigate this
problem."" Even after the implementation of Miranda one sees the
lower courts still relying excessively on sources of information which,
to a large extent, are unreliable.
A strong case can be made that in Denver the prosecution has
a special advantage -the warning form used by the Denver Police
Department. If the judge, when given the form, sees that the suspect
has signed both the warning and waiver provisions (although the
only waiver provision that appears is for fifth amendment rights), the
defendant will ordinarily be hard pressed to convince the judge that
he did not understand his rights or that he was induced to sign
through promises or threats. The warning form often serves as
tangible evidence for the prosecution to support its allegations, and
some judges in Denver appear to treat the signatures on the form
as the creation of an almost conclusive presumption of waiver -

or at

least prima facie evidence that is difficult to rebut.'
While the
suspect may be given the opportunity to contradict the allegation of
waiver, normally his uncorroborated assertions would seem to be given
little credence and are summarily dismissed.
It is submitted that giving the signatures decisive weight is
entirely inconsistent with the spirit of Miranda. Any realistic analysis
of the events of the interrogation room leads to the conclusion that
the suspect's conduct itself is often inconsistent with an inference
of waiver. He may sign the waiver provision, and at the same time
request counsel; or he may state that he does not want to talk before
succumbing to the pressure of a persistent interrogator. Moreover, the
findings of this study indicate that often the suspect does not fully
understand the rights which he is alleged to have knowingly and
intelligently waived,'

and he -ften does not understand the sig-

118 Elsen & Rosett, supra note 58, at 649.
119 For an appellate case illustrating the significance of the waiver form, see Neitz v. People,
462 P.2d 498 (Colo. 1969).
120
See text, §§ II(B) & (C) supra.

1970

POLICE INTERROGATION IN COLORADO

nificance of the waiver form which he signs. 2 ' Finally, the data
suggest that police interrogation tactics are often directed not only
to eliciting a statement or confession from the suspect, but also to
securing either a "knowing and intelligent" waiver, or legally sufficient evidence of such a waiver as that standard is defined by the
courts.' 2 2 It thus appears that the major evidentiary link between the
interrogation room and the courtroom is inherently unreliable. Developing accurately the events which occurred in the interrogation
room and the suspect's unique situation there may be difficult. Yet,
if the purpose of Miranda is to be fulfilled, the courts must take
the more difficult path.
In the Miranda hearings in Denver, as they are presently conducted, the defendant is frequently dependent upon the police to
support his assertions. The problem of the defense counsel then is the
objectivity and reliability of the police witness. As Miranda implies,
in many instances police cannot be relied upon to establish objectively
the events which transpired in the interrogation room. Their unreliability may be attributed to multiple factors. Few consciously lie, but
many may distort the truth because of what they perceive to be their own
interest in the case. Another reason for police distortions during the
Miranda hearings is that Miranda itself is heinous to them, and they
may feel that in Miranda the Supreme Court has called their credibility
into question. 123 It may thus be chimerical to expect them to describe
their own conduct and that of the suspect during questioning objectively.
A strong case can be made that the state should be compelled to
provide a more accurate and reliable record of events in the interrogation room than is presently provided through the testimony of
police officers. For instance, tape recording the entire interrogation
session might resolve the problems of selective recordation or inaccurate reconstruction of the events occurring in the interrogation
room. The defendant would then not be forced to depend on his
interrogator to testify that he requested counsel or that he was induced
to talk through promises and threats. Moreover, the recordings would
give the court a better basis to determine whether there has been "a
knowing and intelligent waiver." And perhaps most importantly, they
would give the court an opportunity to evaluate and control police
conduct in the interrogation room.
121 See text, § II(E) supra.
122 See text, § III supra. It appears that Colorado courts only require an express waiver of
the privilege against self-incrimination, although the Miranda Court seemed to contemplate an express waiver of both the privilege and the right to counsel. See note 28 supra
& text accompanying note 10 supra.
123 See text accompanying notes 100-103 supra.
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In addition, the police should be compelled to use scientific
testing equipment, which is normally at their disposal, for interrogation purposes. For example, if a suspect appears to be drunk (or
"looks like he has been drinking") they should give him a breathalyzer or blood alcohol test before asking him to sign a warning
form or questioning him. If the state ordinarily uses special procedures
to build its case against a suspect, those procedures should also be
used to enable the suspect to protect his rights.
If implemented, these reforms could go a long way toward
improving the Miranda hearing as a fact finding proceeding. Countervailing considerations, of course, should also be taken into account.
It may be arguable that the presence of the tape recorder would
interfere with the discretionary powers of the police and would
further damage their morale. Their conduct in the interrogation room
might be inhibited and possibly fewer statements would be elicited.
However, the conclusion is inescapable that if the Miranda hearing
is to serve any meaningful function, it must provide a better means
of establishing the events which transpired in the interrogation room.
CONCLUSION:

A

NONWAIVABLE

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

When the United States Supreme Court in the Miranda decision
changed the rules of interrogation to give the suspect a battery of
protections against the "inherently compelling pressures" of the
interrogation room, the game of interrogation became inordinately
subtle and complex.
First, the suspect was given the right to knowledge of his
privilege against self-incrimination- this knowledge to be given in
the form of a warning that he has a right to remain silent. 24 It
appears, however, that the knowledge actually communicated to the
suspect is often too abstract and incomplete to be of much practical
value to him in decisionmaking.' 2" Even the knowledge or the attitudes
and temperament which come with age and experience appear to
have only a minimal impact on the suspect's decision to talk.' 26 In
addition, Miranda notwithstanding, their interrogation room decisions
are often significantly influenced by promises, threats, and the other
psychological tactics and strategies which the Court was attempting
2 T
to neutralize.'
Second, realizing the insufficiency of the warning to protect
privilege
against self-incrimination, the Court extended the sixth
the
124The
2

rationale of the Miranda decision is discussed in § I(A) supra.

11(B) & (C)(1) supra.
text, § 11(C) (2) supra.
127See text, § II(C) (3) supra & Appendices A & B infra.

1

5 See text, §§

126See

1970

POLICE INTERROGATION IN COLORADO

amendment right to counsel to the suspect in the interrogation room
to insure protection of the fifth amendment privilege.12 8 The most
apparent possible problem with the Court's holding in this regard
is that the means adopted to protect the right to counsel in the
interrogation room was the same device which was to be employed
to protect the privilege against self-incrimination- a warning to the
suspect advising him of his rights.1' Although the data in this study
revealed that suspects generally possessed an awarenes of the right
to counsel (probably a prior knowledge), the findings also suggested
that the police are able to frustrate the exercise of this right - either
by failure to comply with requests for counsel, by inducing waiver of
the right, or by both. 1 30
Third, the Court held that if the interrogation continues without
the presence of counsel, then a heavy burden rests upon the prosecution to establish that the suspect "knowingly and intelligently waived"
his constitutional rights.13 1 A description of the ease with which a
legally enforceable "knowing and intelligent waiver" of constitutional
rights could be obtained from an unknowing suspect completed the
analysis of the impact of Miranda on the suspect's position in the
game of interrogation.'32
The response of the Denver police to Miranda was found to
be strict compliance with its formal requirements.13 However, this
was not found to be inconsistent with the strategy of directing interrogation room tactics against the suspect's weakest positions: (1) a
poor understanding of the warnings and his constitutional rights,
from which he is easily distracted; and (2) a propensity to sign the
waiver of rights form with little or no inducement." 4 Psychological
pressures, including promises and threats, were found to be used
to induce the suspect to talk and to waive his right to counsel in
interrogation.'3
The police strategies appeared to be structured around the
evidentiary problems posed by the legal framework of the interrogation game. One of their goals is to obtain tangible evidence of the
suspect's knowledge of his rights and tangible evidence of the
suspect's knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.1 1 6 The warning
"'8See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
129 Id.
0
13
See
131See
132 See
133 See
134See

text, § 11(D) supra.
text accompanying note 10 supra.
text, § 11(E) supra.
text, § I(B) (2) supra.
text, § III supra.

13 See text, §§ II(C)(3) & III supra.
136 See text, § 111(B) supra.
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and waiver form is effective in attaining this goal.137 A second implicit
goal appeared to be to avoid compilation of tangible evidence of
inducements to waive constitutional rights. 38 Privacy in the interrogation room and selective recordation of the interrogation is apparently
effective in accomplishing this goal. l3 9
The response of some of the state trial courts in Colorado
appeared to be conducive to the success of the police strategy. The
limited information collected suggested that judicial consideration in
a Miranda hearing often does not go beyond a consideration of the
signatures on the warning form, the police testimony, and the
defendant's criminal record1 4 - evidence which, in light of the findings of this study, was shown to be questionable at best.' 4 1 Thus the
impact of Miranda on the ultimate interrogation contest seems to have
been effectively neutralized. Indeed, one of the latent functions of
Miranda,as implemented in Colorado, appears to be to aid the police in
overcoming their evidentiary burden with respect to proving the suspect's
knowledge and waiver of his constitutional rights. 4 '
A suggestion for improving the evidentiary link between the
interrogation room and the courtroom was presented in the previous
section' 4 3 -mandatory
full disclosure of the events of the interrogation process. The implementation of this suggestion, however, does
not resolve the basic conflict between the ideals implicit in Miranda
and the apparent realities of the interrogation game. This would not
give the suspect the working knowledge or practical understanding
of his constitutional rights which the Court assumed was necessary
to the protection of those rights. Furthermore, there is no conclusive
evidence which suggests that if the suspect did have such knowledge,
it would be useful to him in combating successfully the inherently
compelling pressures of the interrogation room."'
Without adequate knowledge or some other means to successfully
combat interrogation room pressures, no waiver can be knowing and
intelligent (warnings and signatures as evidence to the contrary
notwithstanding). It was perhaps in deference to this proposition that
the Court held the right to counsel indispensable to the protection of
the fifth amendment privilege. " However, the Court appears to
13 See text, § IV(B) supra.
138 See text, §§ III(A) & IV(B) supra.
39

1

Id.

140 See text, § IV supra; Neitz v. People, 462 P.2d 498 (Colo. 1969).
141 See discussion of these findings in this regard in text, § IV(B) supra.
142See text, § IV(B) supra & text accompanying notes 49 & 50 supra.
143 See text, § IV(B) supra.
'44See text, § II(C) supra.
14 See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
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have diluted this secondary protection beyond effectiveness by making
this right waivable as well- and as easily.' 4 ' As such, the right to
counsel in the interrogation room appears to be only another Pawn
with which to protect the King's Rook.' 47
A case can be made that a means to give the present fifth
amendment waiver standard more integrity is to make the right to
counsel nonwaivable. Arguably, with the opportunity to consult with
counsel before interrogation and with his assistance in the interrogation room, the suspect will be able to make the kind of "knowing
and intelligent waiver" of his fifth amendment right which was
contemplated by the Miranda Court. The reform should be evaluated in
terms of its effects on the rights of the accused as well as its impact on
traditional law enforcement functions.
The presence of counsel at every interrogation would immediately
satisfy the suspect's sixth amendment right and would give him a
better opportunity to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination.
The reform would solve most of the problems with respect to
Miranda's implementation which have been described in this study.
The suspect would have the benefit of greater knowledge of his
rights and of the consequences of his interrogation room decisions.
He would be less vulnerable to psychological manipulation. With
the assistance of counsel, he would have the opportunity to bargain
intelligently with his interrogator. Furthermore, the presence of counsel per se would probably inhibit the exercise of abusive pressures
within the interrogation room.
The presence of a lawyer at every custodial interrogation would
probably make the Mi.randa hearing a much more significant proceeding. Counsel could act as a witness and testify during the
hearing. His testimony would be given the same weight as that of
the police. When counsel testifies, the court will have more information and, as a result, a better basis for determining the events which
actually transpired. Also, if the court has the benefit of such testimony
regularly, it will be in a better position to control police conduct in
the interrogation room.
The principal argument against a nonwaivable right to counsel
is that it might interfere with certain law enforcement objectives.
Besides convicting perpetrators of crimes, these objectives are, among
others, identifying and implicating accomplices, clearing other crimes,
and recovery of stolen goods.' 4 8 In considering the probable effects
of the reform on these law enforcement objectives, one can safely
assume that the interrogators would not be able to elicit as many
See text, § 11(D) supra.
But see text accompanying note 43 supra.
148 Interrogations, supra note 36, at 1593-97.
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statements and confessions if a lawyer were always present, because
in most instances lawyers would advise their clients not to talk.
The first article on Miranda in the Yale Law Journal sheds some
light on the relationship between incriminating statements and convictions. The authors concluded that the presence of a lawyer during
interrogation can affect the suspect's probability of conviction in less
than 10 percent of the cases. The reason is that in about 90 percent
of the cases the police have enough evidence to convict even before
beginning interrogation.14 9
Even though the presence of a lawyer at every interrogation
would not affect conviction rates very substantially, it may be that
the reform would in some instances prevent the police from obtaining information which is now often available to them. For example,
a suspect, who might in the absence of counsel have revealed the name
of an accomplice whose existence was previously unknown to them,
may not release this information if counsel is present.
Similarly, a suspect who has committed multiple crimes (with
which the police had not associated him) may be less likely to clear
the books by confessing to all of them if counsel is present. However,
a persuasive argument can be made that efforts to clear the books
are too often "fishing expeditions" which should not be encouraged
50
anyway.1
An additional argument against a nonwaivable right to counsel
is that the public would have to bear the increased cost of providing
lawyers for the interrogations of all indigent suspects rather than for
the few who presently exercise the sixth amendment right. The cost
problem, however, has not been insurmountable in the case of lineups.
While the cost of the reform may pose a problem, further experiments with "station house counsel" may indicate that legal assistance
can be provided at the police station more economically than is presently anticipated.
In conclusion, although some law enforcement objectives might
be adversely affected by a nonwaivable right to counsel, it is submitted that the social cost of preserving the present rules for interrogation is greater than the cost of implementing the reform. As presently applied, Miranda is an expression of judicial mythology. It is a
case which impressively defines fundamental rights but does not go
far enough in providing practical remedies. A nonwaivable right to
counsel would enable virtually all suspects to exercise the rights in
the interrogation contest which they are already supposed to have.
The reform would be a step in the direction of making the Miranda
149 Id. at 1600.
15°Id. at 1595-96.
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"a working instrument of the law"

rather than

"a mere

declaration of intent."''
APPENDIX A
PROMISES AND THREATS
Suspects' descriptions of promises or threats allegedly made to them at Denver
Police Station (unless otherwise noted) as an incentive to talk; whether they
made statements; whether they made admission or confession.
(1) Threat: "If you won't talk to us, I'll file probation violation on you."
Statement-Yes; Admission or Confession-Yes.
(2) Promise: "If you tell us who else sells dope in Kansas City, then we will
let you go." Statement-Yes; Admission-Yes. Not at Denver Police
Station.
(3) Threat: "If you refuse to talk about this charge, then we'll file other
charges on you." Statement - Yes; Admission - No.
(4) Threat-promise: "If you won't tell us anything, then we'll definitely file
on you. If you talk, we may not. Other guy made statement that put all
of the blame on you. You'll be better off if you talk." Statement-No;
Admission - No.
(5) Promise: "If you talk, I'll see that your bond is low so that you'll be able
to get out." Statement - Yes; Confession - Yes.
(6) Threat-promise: "If neither of you admits that you own the heroin,
then we'll prosecute both of you for conspiracy. If you admit that you
bought the heroin and that it was strictly for your own use, then your
friend will be released." Statement
Yes; Confession
Yes.
(7) Promise (to wife): "If you admit possession, then we won't file on your
husband." Statement - No; Confession - No.
(8) Promise: "If you will cooperate, we will file only one of the charges
against you. Only one count will be filed. The others will be dropped."
Statement - Yes; Confession - Yes.
(9) Threat-promise: "If you don't answer questions, DA will bring first
degree murder. If you talk to us, then you'll probably get self-defense
or involuntary manslaughter. It will help you to make a statement."
Statement - Yes; Confession - No.
(10) Threat-promise: "If you do not sign form and answer questions, we will
charge you with being a habitual criminal . . . life in pen. If you admit
these ten burglaries, then we'll drop all but one and drop possession too."
Statement - Yes; Confession - Yes. (Claims he made confession which
was not true.)
(11)
Promise: "If you cooperate and talk, then we'll try to have the charges
dropped. The most time you'd get is a few months." Statement- No;
Confession - No.
(12) Promise. "If you admit to these burglaries, then we won't file additional
burglaries and habitual criminal against you. We'd also get you a law
bond so that you could get out of jail. Your bond will be lower if you
talk." Statement - No; Confession - No.
(13)
Promise: "I won't file the robbery charge against you if you talk to us
about the rape." Statement - Yes; Confession - Yes.
151Elsen & Rosett, supra note 58, at 645.
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(14)

Promise: "If you can tell me who's doing these robberies (someone else?)
then I won't file the second case on you. Help me and I'll only file one
charge." Statement -

(15)

(16)

(17)
(18)

(20)

Yes; Admission -

Yes.

Threat: "If you don't talk to us, we won't give your wife protection."
Claims he was physically coerced to talk (pushed around). Claims interrogator deliberately opened drawer in which guns were present.
Promise-threat: "If you admit to one aggravated robbery, then we'll drop
the other one. If you don't talk to us, we'll tell the DA that you were
uncooperative and that won't help you." Statement - No; Confession
No.
Promise: "If you tell us where some labs are and help us to bust one,
we will help you get a law bond." Statement - Yes; Confession - Yes.
Threat-promise (murder charge): "If you don't talk to us, we're going
to put your wife in jail and your baby son in an adoption home. If you
tell us what happened, we can go much easier on you." Statement -No;
Confession -

(19)
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No.

Threat (by South Carolina Police): "If you won't talk to us, then we'll
put you in isolation." Statement- No; Confession - No. No promises
or threats when questioned by Denver Police. Statement - No; Confession - No.
Promise-threat: "To make it easier on yourself, you should cop out to
burglary and we will drop the other charges. Don't be bone-headed.
If you won't talk to us, we'll file six or seven other charges against you.
If you admit to burglary, then we'll drop the rest." Statement - No;
Confession -

No.

(21)

"If you cooperate by making a statement, things will go much easier for
you in court. You'll be on the basketball court much sooner if you make

(22)

Promise-threat (murder): "If you tell us what happened, then we'll
probably be able to get you into a hospital or the worst we'll do is get
you voluntary." Suspect claims that he was physically harrassed in that
police would wake him up from his sleep a few times a night in order
to question him. Felt that if he refused to talk to them and sign statement
that he would be "slapped around." Suspect says: Statement-No;
Confession - No. Police contend that they have a statement which he
made.
Promise-threat: "I should think you'd be man enough to give us a statement and save Geraldine. You could help her. DA has agreed that
Geraldine had no foreknowledge of what would happen. The judge isn't
going to like it if you refuse to talk and cooperate. If you will give us
written statement, then we will release Geraldine." Statement -Yes;

a statement." Statement -

(23)

Confession -

(24)

(25)

Yes; Confession -

No.

Yes.

Ambiguous promise: "You are only being charged with assault with a
deadly weapon. You'll be much better off if you tell us exactly what
happened. You don't have to worry about prison. Most you can get is
a fine." Victim died the next day and the charges were changed to
manslaughter. Statement - Yes; Confession - Yes (assault with a deadly
weapon charge).
Threat: "If you are not the one who stole those bottles, then your wife
and mother-in-law are going to jail. Either you stole them or they did."
Statement -

Yes; Confession -

No.
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APPENDIX

B

REASONS FOR TALKING
Reasons suspects made statements, admissions, or confessions, as enumerated by
them.
(1)

Caught red-handed in building.

(2)

Fear of physical harm; worn down by persistent questioning; promise to
reduce severity of charges if he confessed.

(3)

Felt that truth would get him out of jail.

(4)
(5)

Was tired and wanted to cooperate with police.
Thought statements would help him because he thought they were
exculpatory.
Intoxicated when questioned; not informed that he would be charged
with murder at the time he made statement.
Wanted to cooperate; felt that asking for a lawyer would slow things up,
police had so much other evidence.
Admitted that he stole the goods because police had the stuff anyway.

(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

(12)
(13)
(14)

(15)
(16)

(17)
(18)

(19)

To show that he was cooperative; misrepretation by police, they told him
he would be charged with misdemeanor - charged with felony.
Promise would free the other party if he confessed; confessed to get
friend out of jail.
Can't stand the city jail (can't take a shower there, crowded); felt that
if he refused to talk or ask for lawyer, it would slow things up and he
would have to spend more time there; claims that he was pressured into
waiving rights because of intolerable conditions at city jail.
Promise: If he talked, police would drop some of charges; if he talked
he would get out of jail sooner.
Talked to speed things up and get cops off his back.
Thought he was not making a statement when he was answering questions; thought police would use what he said to help him in their
investigation.
Made statement because she was upset, felt terrible and had to talk to
someone.
Thought statements were not incriminating, thought truth would help,
didn't realize cops might use his statement for impeachment in court;
promises and threats, use of sympathy tactics by police, police broke him
down by persistent questioning even after he asked for lawyer.
Threatened with being charged with habitual criminal, promise not to do
so if he talked.
Sick and tired of sitting around jail; friendly detective promised that
he wouldn't file aggravated robbery if suspect made statement; thought
if he talked to cops, he would be allowed to talk with parole officer
sooner.
Made statement that "he might have done it" because he thought he was
having friendly conversation with cop who was friend, didn't realize
that he was making a statement which could be used against him in court;
thought that there could be no statement except in writing and with
signature.

